

Information Transmission by International Organizations: A Reassessment

Jonathan A. Chu
April 1, 2018

Abstract

Scholars argue that governments can raise global approval for their wars by acquiring the backing of an international organization (IO). This conventional wisdom further argues that IOs with certain institutional properties are said to credibly convey the merits of military action, thus winning the support of skeptical foreign citizens. Despite the argument's importance to our understanding of IOs, existing studies do not fully articulate and test the theory's claims. This article provides this much-needed assessment by studying how IOs affect Japanese opinions on American military intervention. Drawing from news articles and historical polls, it first contextualizes the theoretical relevance and policy importance of the case. Then, through two original survey experiments, it shows that IOs raise foreign approval but in ways that fundamentally contradict the extant wisdom. People's concerns about an IO's material capabilities and social representation could explain the anomalous findings. Ultimately, this article finds that researchers are right to link IOs to domestic politics, but also discovers an untapped opportunity to better understand why and how that link exists.

Jonathan Chu is a Ph.D. Candidate at Stanford University (jonchu@stanford.edu). I thank Masaru Kohno and graduate students at Waseda University for their feedback and assistance in implementing the surveys used in this paper. I am also grateful for comments by Sarah Bush, Christina Davis, Erik Gartzke, Regan Kao at Stanford's East Asian Library, Azusa Katagiri, Risa Kitagawa, Steve Krasner, Phillip Lipsky, Megumi Naoi, Ken Schultz, Mike Tomz, and Yasuhito Uto and panel participants at the Carleton Interventions Workshop (Ottawa), Stanford Juku, ISA (Baltimore), and the West Coast International Relations of East Asia (USC) conferences. Stanford IRB Protocol #32333

For many analysts, the global backlash against the United States' 2003 Iraq War demonstrated that governments must manage foreign public opinion to prevent international censure and the erosion of their country's soft power.¹ To this end, some authors argue that countries can garner international policy support by obtaining the backing of an international organization (IO). This has led to the articulation of a variety of informational theories about the effects of IO policy support.² By drawing an analogy between IOs and domestic legislative and constitutional institutions,³ these theories argue that when an IO endorses a policy, it persuades skeptical foreign citizens that the policy is worth supporting. Furthermore, neutral and conservative IOs that encompass a diverse group of countries and that function as an elite pact, like the UN Security Council (UNSC), are theorized to be particularly influential.

Whether these claims are correct impacts both researchers and policymakers. In the academic realm, the information thesis contributes to our fundamental understanding of how IOs work and why they appear legitimate. Earlier work on these organizations focus on the ability of IOs to directly affect state-to-state relations,⁴ while the informational perspective ushers newer research on the *indirect* and *sub-national* channels of IO influence. The theory might also bring clarity to the often nebulous concept of institutional

¹ Nye 2004; Pape 2005; Goldsmith and Horuichi 2009; Goldsmith and Horuichi 2012.

² The information argument is actually a family of theories (e.g. Voeten 2005; Fang 2007; Thompson 2009; Chapman 2011; Tago and Ikeda 2015), so the proceeding section will specify the different versions of the information theory and their specific implications.

³ E.g. Krehbiel 1991; Weingast 1997.

⁴ E.g. Keohane 1984; Stein 1990.

legitimacy: it argues that IOs appear to have a legitimizing power among foreign audiences because they allow citizens to quickly learn the virtues and faults of a new policy.⁵

These theories also have implications for policy: they suggest substantial policy measures for governments weighing the merits of multilateralism in war. For example, should a country wait, while a brutal regime commits mass atrocities, as its diplomats pursue the institutional support of an IO? IOs matter, and whether they matter in the precise manner proposed by the information argument affects the moral and material calculus behind such questions. For example, the argument implies that the costs of procuring an IO's, and especially the UNSC's, seal of approval might be offset by the benefits of winning the support of foreign audiences.⁶

Despite these significant implications, a persuasive test of the information argument's hypotheses remains elusive. Some studies attempt to infer the effect of IOs by analyzing correlations between the policy positions of IOs and foreign support for the U.S.'s policies, but these approaches are frustrated by inferential issues such as omitted variable and selection biases. Additionally, limitations in existing datasets hamper researchers' ability to test the theory's mechanisms relating to an IO's membership composition,⁷ which can illuminate *how* IOs affect public opinion. Finally, the existence of many different variations of the information argument leaves a conceptual and

⁵ In contrast, non-rationalist and state-level accounts of institutional legitimacy include: Claude 1966; Finnemore 2003; Hurd 2007.

⁶ This is, of course, not the only benefit of an IO's policy endorsement.

⁷ Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu 2016, see especially Figure 5.

theoretical opportunity to synthesize these existing theories and articulate their various empirical implications.

To fill in this gap, this research employed an original experimental research design to evaluate the role of IOs in mobilizing foreign public opinion.⁸ The experiments were conducted in Japan, a context that is—according to history, news articles, and observational data reviewed in this paper—a theoretically and policy relevant case for studying the effect of IOs on foreign preferences for U.S. military policy.⁹ Specifically, the study involved embedding experiments in two national surveys administered to Japanese citizens. Survey respondents read about the U.S.’s decision to deploy its military to save lives in a civil war. Based on random assignment, respondents read different scenarios that indicated whether the UNSC and/or NATO endorsed or renounced the use of force. They then expressed their approval of the U.S.’s armed intervention. The survey also recorded background foreign policy variables that were used to analyze the heterogeneous effects of IOs.

The analysis shows that, as the information theory predicts, IO support increases foreign war approval. But contrary to the argument, the UNSC had little effect on mass approval of war while NATO did. Furthermore, people’s beliefs about an IO’s membership composition do not moderate the effect of IOs, and those who view the U.S. as an

⁸ Other international relations scholars have also found it useful to employ the experimental methods to test the implications of formal models in which outcomes are about individual preferences. E.g. Tomz 2007; Tingley and Wang 2010; Tingley and Walter 2011; Kertzer and Brutger 2016; Quek 2017.

⁹ Other IR experiments on Japanese opinions include Naoi and Kume 2011; Naoi and Kume 2015. The conclusion discusses the case’s generalizability.

imprudent military power look to NATO (the far less neutral and conservative IO) for reassurance rather than the UNSC. Thus, while the information theories provide several important insights into the domestic process through which IOs affect foreign opinion, they cannot fully account for the reasons *why* and *how* that process exists. The discussion section of this paper proposes two tentative explanations to make sense of the puzzling results. Rather than caring about the diversity or conservativeness of an IO's membership, people might care more about whether an IO is operationally effective or represents the views of countries with whom they can socially identify.

This paper makes several contributions. First, it provides a systematic discussion of the informational theories and extracts their core empirical claims. Second, it tests those claims using a major new data set that draws from a novel experimental design, and in doing so, overcomes the problems of causal inference that have hampered previous efforts to identify the effect of IOs.¹⁰ Next, it is also the first experimental study to measure the independent effect of an IO other than the UNSC, which is of practical relevance given that the UNSC is not the only IO that passes judgment on U.S. foreign policy.¹¹ By directly testing how public perceptions of an IO's membership moderates the effect of an IO's signal, the findings can also shed new light on central theoretical claims about the role of

¹⁰ In an important study, Tago and Ikeda (2015) employs an experimental design but focuses on the Security Council and does not answer questions regarding institutional preference distributions and the political reassurance of war-weary publics. The conclusion discusses why this article produces different findings, and why the seemingly disparate findings are actually compatible.

¹¹ Greico et al. 2011 estimate the *joint effect* of the UNSC and NATO in the U.S. context.

preference distribution in effectiveness of IO cues. Lastly, the study identifies a previously missed opportunity for theory building and empirical study, and probes two alternative explanations to open new avenues for the research agenda on the domestic politics of IOs.

Garnering Global Approval through IOs: Existing Theory and Evidence

Scholars argue that one major reason why governments would like to secure foreign approval for their policies is to maintain their global “soft power,” which is a country’s ability to obtain policy outcomes through cooptation and attraction rather than through direct inducement and coercion.¹² Relatedly, researchers observe that antagonistic opinions abroad can trigger soft-balancing, which occurs when governments and their citizens take non-military and indirect actions to challenge and undermine the foreign policy of another state.¹³ The stakes of losing one’s soft power are all but soft. Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2012), for example, find that negative attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy restricted foreign troop contributions to the Iraq War, hampered compliance with American demands in the International Criminal Court, and lost the U.S. favorable votes in the UN General Assembly. The erosion of soft power manifests in less direct ways, too. Unsympathetic or hostile popular sentiment can become institutionalized into long-term, harmful policies.¹⁴ Foreign attitudes about the U.S. can also affect the ability of the U.S. to push for liberal

¹² Nye 1990; Nye 2004.

¹³ Pape 2005, 10; Paul 2005

¹⁴ McAdam 2007.

policies such as increasing female representation in politics in other countries.¹⁵ For these reasons, some authors find that securing the policy approval of foreign audiences, at least in some situations, is even more vital than that of domestic audiences.¹⁶

Information theories observe that, without the endorsement of an IO, countries may find it very difficult to raise foreign support for their military actions. Citizens abroad might be uncertain about whether another country's proposal to use military force will produce good outcomes and will not disrupt the international system, which may be a result of or be compounded by their uncertainty about the motives of a military power.¹⁷ However, they cannot necessarily trust another government to accurately portray the merits of military action: said government could have private incentives and biases to misrepresent the case for war.¹⁸ Nor do they have the means to independently gather information about pros and cons of another country's foreign policy. To escape this dilemma, citizens might turn to an IO for a "second opinion" and be more willing to support a war that is IO-sanctioned.¹⁹ Thus, *the policy endorsements of IOs raises foreign public support for war.*²⁰

¹⁵ Bush and Jamal 2012.

¹⁶ Thompson 2009, 66-7

¹⁷ Voeten 2005; Thompson 2009; Chapman 2011.

¹⁸ Fang 2008.

¹⁹ These authors link IOs to public opinion, but of course, IOs can also communicate to other audiences like elites. In any case, these other audiences are beyond this paper's scope.

²⁰ To be clear, some researchers focus solely on an IO's influence on foreign audiences, while others examine domestic audiences, while yet others investigate both. But the argument's core theoretical logic are the same either way. Due to a principal-agent problem, citizens (the principal)—whether domestic or foreign—are uncertain about a

There are different variants of the “information argument,” and while they make distinct theoretical claims, they all directly imply that *the UNSC has a particularly strong influence on mass opinion*.

One leading view presented by Thompson (2009) is that an IO’s persuasive abilities originates from its *neutrality*, which is a direct function of the heterogeneity or diversity of its membership. Drawing from formal models on the informational role of legislative committees,²¹ the logic here is that if several disparate countries agree on a policy, the policy must be good or at least innocuous. Thompson note that “in security matters, the Security Council...comes closest to operating as a neutral representative of the international community in a case of military intervention.”²² He further explains that “this logic helps explain why regional organizations, comprised of a less diverse set of states, do not produce a legitimation effect equivalent to that of the Security Council,” including “the more parochial NATO.”²³ This view thus implies that the UNSC, which includes a diverse set of countries, has a greater effect than endorsements from more homogenous IOs like NATO. This view also implies that the more one perceives an IO as neutral/diverse, the more she will be influenced by the policy cues of that IO.

government’s (or the agent’s) proposal to deploy military force because that government may have biases and motives that diverge from citizens. IOs resolve that uncertainty by providing a credible source of information and check on the agent.

²¹ Krehbiel 1991.

²² Thompson 2009, 37.

²³ *Ibid.*, 38.

A second version of the information argument also touts the UNSC's sway over mass attitudes in the context of U.S. intervention. Chapman (2011) argues that *conservative* IOs reveal the most information through their policy authorizations, where conservativeness is operationalized by the *distance* between an IO's pivotal member and the cue recipient.²⁴ He develops this logic in the context of how IOs affect U.S. domestic opinion but notes that "the same logic that applies to domestic interests applies to foreign interests: foreign audiences can infer that authorization from a body with a high 'legislative hurdle' is unlikely unless the potential negative consequences of foreign policy are minimal" (140).

This conceptualization of conservativeness is distinct from Thompson's idea of neutrality or diversity; however, the theory similar predicts that the UNSC endorsements have an especially powerful effect on citizens in countries like the U.S. and Japan. That is, countries in the UNSC like Russia and China hold sharply divergent preferences from democratic citizens, and thus, the UNSC's policy approval is *conservatively* given, or clears an especially "high legislative hurdle," and sends a strong signal about the merits of the policy. A direct hypothesis from this argument is that public support for U.S. intervention is higher with the UNSC's support than without it. Additionally, the argument implies that the more an IO is perceived to be conservative/distant, the more influential that IO will be.

²⁴ Chapman 2011, 51-56. See also Chapter 5 for a specific discussion about foreign public opinion.

Further reflecting the UNSC's prominence, Voeten (2005) argues that the UNSC, because it is an elite-pact among great powers,²⁵ is particularly well-suited for assuring citizens that a policy will neither trigger great power conflict nor destabilize the international system. Unlike the concepts of neutrality/diversity and conservativeness/distance, the elite-pact argument does not state that the legitimizing power of the UNSC originates from its membership's preference distribution. It instead argues that the UNSC's influence is a result of a coordination of beliefs about the UNSC as a particular institution. While it was not "inevitable" that the UNSC would take on the characteristics of an elite pact, "the institutional design of the [Security Council] did make it a more viable candidate than alternative institutions."²⁶ Indeed, alternative institutions like NATO are a suboptimal institution for achieve these goals of reassuring audiences who fear exploitation by the United States.²⁷ Lastly, even research that does not explicitly argue that the UNSC is uniquely influential nevertheless focus on the UNSC and do not directly assess other IOs.²⁸ In sum, all versions of the theory predict the UNSC will have a strong effect on foreign opinions, while implicitly or explicitly arguing that alternative IOs like NATO will have a weaker impact. The empirical sections will test these claim in addition to their sub-hypotheses regarding IO neutrality/diversity and conservativeness/distance.

²⁵ Drawing an analogy to Weingast 1997.

²⁶ Voeten 2005, 547.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 541-2.

²⁸ E.g. Fang 2008; Brooks and Valentino 2011; Tingley and Tomz 2013.

The information theories also make predictions about whose opinions will be most affected by the policy positions of an IO. If the purpose of IOs is to assuage skeptics of military intervention, then the effect of IOs should be strongest among foreigners who are the most wary of the U.S. as a military superpower. After all, if a citizen already embraces the U.S.'s military role in global affairs, why should she bother to seek institutional reassurance? In the analogous context of mobilizing domestic support for war, for example, those who lack confidence in their president are most persuaded by the endorsements of international institutions.²⁹ The hypothesis that follows it that *the more citizens believe that the U.S. is irresponsible in its application of military force, the more they will value the authorization of an IO*. Skeptics of the U.S. should particularly be interested in seeking reassurance from a neutral, conservative, and elite-pact constrained IOs like the UNSC, as opposed to an IO like NATO that is often perceived to be at the U.S.'s beck and call and therefore not a credible constraint on the U.S.'s foreign policy.

Despite their theoretical importance, the information arguments have yet to be subjected to complete empirical testing. Thompson (2009) shows that the UNSC's authorization of the First Gulf War was crucial for rallying international participation and support for the U.S.'s military policies, while UNSC disapproval in 2003 spurred international censorship of the U.S.'s Iraq invasion. While trenchant in its theoretical depth and analysis, this study is limited from establishing a causal link between the UNSC and foreign public opinion. The world's negative reaction to the U.S.'s Iraq War in 2003 could

²⁹ Grieco et al. 2011.

be explained by the fact that the U.S. was simply wrong in its policy. The Bush administration claimed that Saddam Hussein held weapons of mass destruction, but there were none. Leading up to the war, agencies within the U.S. and the UN casted doubt on the WMDs claim. These reservations could explain both global disapproval of the U.S. and the UNSC's refusal to authorize war. In contrast, in 1991 Iraq made an undisputable violation of international territorial norms by invading Kuwait. The UNSC and international audiences could have been responding directly to the incursion into Kuwait rather than the policy cues of each other.

Noting this inferential problem, Tago and Ikeda (2015) provides the first experimental study that shows that the policy position of the UNSC affects foreign public opinion in the context of Japanese attitudes toward U.S. military policy.³⁰ While breaking new ground, this study leaves many theoretical and policy-relevant questions unanswered. By focusing solely on the UNSC, it cannot answer the question of which particular IOs matter most to publics and what about an IO's institutional design enables it to move foreign attitudes. In addition to being of theoretical importance, studying multiple IOs can also shed new light on questions about forum shopping. Voeten (2001), for example, argues that the UNSC's authorizations of war are largely influenced by the existence of "outside options," one of which could be other IOs like NATO.³¹ As a practical matter, governments

³⁰ Of course, survey experiments are no magic bullet, but in this case, the experiments are a useful supplement to the existing observational studies.

³¹ See also Lipsky 2015 on the implications of outside options in the realm of international monetary policy.

often have multiple options when seeking the backing of IOs, and it is useful to know how the UNSC compares to its alternatives. Finally, the study leaves an opportunity to directly test the information theory's claims on IO neutrality and independence, and on reassuring skeptical citizens abroad.

Research Methods

This analysis tests three main implications of the information theory. First, the endorsement of IOs raises foreign approval of U.S. military policy. Second, the UNSC should be especially influential due to its membership composition. And third, the effect of IOs is strongest among those suspicious of the U.S. military power. It evaluates these claims via experiments embedded into two opinion polls fielded in Japan.

The Japan Context: Policy and Theoretical Relevance

Japan is an appropriate case for both policy and theoretical reasons. To begin, public opinion contributes to Japanese foreign policy. Despite the bureaucracy and media's influential role,³² researchers nevertheless demonstrate that Japanese citizens make a difference to their country's foreign policy decisions.³³ In an exhaustive study of the public's impact on foreign policy since the end of WWII, Paul Midford concludes that "Japanese public opinion is influential because it is stable, coherent, and, regarding beliefs about the utility of military force, not easily or quickly swayed by elite attempts to influence

³² Johnson 1975; Shinoda 2007

³³ Risse-Kappen 1991, 508-9; Katzenstein 2008, 19.

it.”³⁴ Other research further finds that Japanese citizens tend to be a “conservative” force on statecraft, constraining policy-makers from pursuing more militaristic actions such as contributing to U.S. military operations.³⁵ This is consistent with the broader literature on the role of public opinion in providing democratic constraints on their governments.³⁶ Lastly, Japan plays a crucial role in contemporary U.S. foreign policy in Asia. The U.S. has sought to meet a rising Chinese power by strengthening its alliances with neighboring countries like Japan, which makes the policy attitudes of these countries’ citizens all the more relevant to U.S. soft power.

The Japan case is also well-suited for theory testing. In particular, the information hypotheses make an antecedent assumption that U.S. foreign policy and the conduct of IOs are politically salient among a foreign audience. Japan satisfies this assumption.

Having lost the Pacific War to the U.S., Japan’s political development has since been intimately tied to, and even outrightly manufactured by, the American government. Japan’s postwar constitution limits its ability to deploy military force, and it thus relies greatly on U.S.’s guarantees for security, though Japan retains a substantial discretion over its deployment of foreign aid and non-combat troops (i.e. its military, the Self Defense Force or SDF). In tandem during the post-war period, Japan joined the United Nations and has become particularly active in UN activities like peacekeeping. And since the end of the Cold War, but ever so importantly with Japan’s increasing wariness of China and continued

³⁴ Midford 2011, 7.

³⁵ Bobrow 1989; Berger 2003; Midford 2006.

³⁶ E.g. Aldrich et al. 2006; Baum and Potter 2015.

struggle to join UNSC's permanent membership, Japan has ramped up its involvement with NATO. Japan is one of NATO's "partners across the globe" and cooperates with NATO in numerous domains such as humanitarian relief and state building. For example, Japan pledged \$5 billion for the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force.³⁷

Reporting by Japanese newspapers reflect this qualitative narrative, which reinforces the theories' assumption that U.S. military intervention and IOs are salient in the foreign audiences' society. Table 1 summarizes the number of Japanese news article *headlines* that include the terms U.S., UNSC, and NATO, along with the WTO and the SDF for benchmarks.³⁸ It include articles from the country's top liberal and conservative newspapers, the Asahi and Yomiuri Shimbun. To investigate issue salience during episodes of U.S. military intervention, Table 1 summarizes news during the 6-month periods surrounding three wars under three different U.S. presidents: March 1999 Kosovo (Clinton); March 2003 Iraq (Bush); and March 2011 Libya (Obama).

Analyzing news headlines shows that the U.S. and IOs are not only politically salient in Japan, but that they are also reported on in ways that fit the historical narrative. In 1999 Kosovo, when the U.S. intervened with NATO but without a UNSC resolution, newspapers reported more heavily about NATO than the UNSC and even its military (347 versus 179 headlines). Surrounding the Iraq invasion, the U.S. received an astoundingly high degree of attention for its unilateralism (726 headlines). In Libya, the UNSC and

³⁷ Additional examples at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50336.htm.

³⁸ To ensure that the term is a substantial article topic, the data counts *headlines* instead of articles that mention the search term anywhere.

NATO played a more equal role, which is reflected in their parity in headlines. Overall, the U.S. was the most salient topic, and the UNSC and NATO were more frequently reported upon than the WTO and sometimes even the SDF.

Table 1: Japanese News Headlines Surrounding Armed Interventions by Three different U.S Presidents

Headlines including...	Jan to June 1999 (Kosovo)		Jan to June 2003 (Iraq)		Jan to June 2011 (Libya)		Total
	Asahi	Yomiuri	Asahi	Yomiuri	Asahi	Yomiuri	
U.S.	436	477	726	581	251	153	2,624
Security Council	72	55	161	176	21	24	509
NATO	347	330	25	37	31	34	804
WTO	110	93	69	57	8	12	349
SDF	179	118	227	148	195	196	1063

Note: From top to bottom, the Japanese search terms were “アメリカ OR 米国”; “国連安全保障理事会 OR 安保理”; “NATO OR ナトー OR 北大西洋条約機構”; “WTO OR 世界貿易機関”; “自衛 OR 自衛隊”. The searches were conducted using the *Asahi Kikuzo II Visual* and the *Yomidasu Rekishikan* (databases).

The prominence of the U.S. and IOs in Japan at the macro and media-levels permeate to the micro, domestic-public level. Opinion polls showcase a substantial degree of Japanese citizen knowledge about NATO and the UN. An analysis of 24 online, panel surveys conducted monthly from October 2011 to September 2013 by researchers at Waseda University reveals substantial foreign policy awareness. As summarized in Table 2A and 2B, the data show that about 60 to 65 percent of survey takers correctly identified NATO as an IO enshrining a military alliance among the U.S., Canada, and major European countries. It also finds that about 55 to 60 percent of the respondents knew that the UN Secretary General (at the time, Ban Ki Moon) was from South Korea. The correct choice was randomized among three reasonable but incorrect answers, and respondents were allowed to, and indeed did so as is common in surveys of Japanese citizens, state “Don’t Know.”³⁹ These results indicate that Japanese citizens are highly informed about the workings of the UN and NATO.

³⁹ For NATO, incorrect choices are an organization to protect the environment, to promote North American free trade, and to promote South and North American cultural exchange. For the UNSC, incorrect choices are USA, China, and Ghana.

Table 2A: Japanese Knowledge of NATO

Q: Which IO is called by the abbreviation NATO?	
Answer Choices	Min to max percentage across surveys
An organization...	
To protect the environment of the Arctic	3.7 to 5.5
To promote free trade on the North American continent	16.3 to 20.2
A military alliance among the US, Canada, and major European countries	59.7 to 65.1
To promote cultural exchange between South and North America	0.7 to 1.5
Don't Know	12.4 to 15.7
Sample Size	2,071 to 3,481

Note: Note: The answer choice order was randomized, except for “don't know,” which was always given last. The data are from a 2011 to 2013 monthly panel survey. The table reports the minimum to maximum range across twenty-four surveys. Data are from the “Survey on the Image of Foreign Countries and Current Topics,” Research Institute of Contemporary Japanese Systems at Waseda University, which are archived at and available from the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Center for Social Research and Data Archives, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo.

Table 2B: Japanese Knowledge of the UN

Q: Where is the current United Nations Secretary General from?	
Answer Choices	Min to max percentage across surveys
USA	4.2 to 5.9
People's Republic of China	3.1 to 6.3
Ghana	5.7 to 8.5
South Korea	56.9 to 61.7
Don't Know	21.8 to 26.4
Sample Size	2,071 to 3,481

Note: Ibid.

In sum, the Japan case sheds light on vital policy considerations in the realm of U.S. military intervention, Asia-Pacific geopolitics, and U.S. and Japanese foreign policy. The case is also suitable for testing the information theories because the U.S., UNSC, and NATO are salient in Japanese media and recognized by Japanese citizens. More generally, IR research often overlooks cases from East Asia to the detriment of building and testing theory.⁴⁰ Studying Japan helps address this shortage.

Survey Implementation and Design

The evidence draws from two national surveys fielded in Japan. Nikkei Research administered online surveys in Japanese to 12,233 adults in March 2015 (Survey #1) and to 3,587 in December 2015 (Survey #2).⁴¹ Nikkei used stratified random sampling procedures to meet demographic and geographic targets based on the *Jūminkihondaichō* (Basic Resident Register). In both surveys, citizens read about a scenario in which the U.S. deployed its military into a civil war to save foreign lives. Online Appendix A provides the Japanese and English translation of the survey.

Survey-takers began by reading (in Japanese) that “A civil war broke out in [country]. During the war, military groups on both the government and anti-government sides killed thousands of civilians, including women and children, and have left tens of

⁴⁰ Johnston 2012

⁴¹ The second wave of data was collected to test the replicability of the main results and to examine follow-up hypotheses and robustness checks (described further in the analysis below). Due to a technical error, Nikkei collected more respondents than the targeted two thousand. The error did not affect the randomization or any other components of the survey.

thousands homeless and starving.” The crisis location was randomly assigned to be one of five countries with a history of conflict and poor human rights: Azerbaijan, Burma (Myanmar), Chad, Colombia, and Yemen. Using multiple contexts that could conceivably experience war increased the survey’s realism and policy relevance and to expand the range of cases the results can speak to. Note, however, that the country was *randomly* and *independently* assigned and thus does not confound inferences about the effect of IOs. The main analysis pools results across all countries. Online Appendix C gives the disaggregated results and shows that they generalize.

Next, the respondents read about the policy positions of NATO and the UNSC, which was experimentally assigned. Respondents were randomly placed in one of four conditions, corresponding to whether each IO opposed or supported U.S. intervention—*None*, *UNSC Only*, *NATO Only*, and *Both*.⁴² For the samples used in the main analysis, respondents read about both the IO’s policy positions and component countries. For example, in the *None* condition, respondents read: “the United Nations Security Council rejected a resolution that would have authorized military action to help these civilians. The United States voted ‘yes’ on the resolution, but France, China, Russia, and the United Kingdom vetoed the resolution by voting ‘no.’ [line break] The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also opposed taking military action. NATO members include Canada, the U.S., and several European countries.” This design choice was made to

⁴² The *None* and *Both* conditions mirror Grieco et al. 2011’s study of US opinions, which helps to establish comparability with existing studies, while the additional two conditions allow the analysis of each IO’s distinct average treat effect.

increase external validity. News reports on IOs almost always discuss specific member countries. But to analyze whether the results are being driven primarily by naming particular countries or by the IOs themselves, I conducted additional experiments in which only the IOs or only the countries were named. These alternative conditions produce similar conclusions (Online Appendix D).

After reading that the U.S. decided to take military action, respondents expressed their approval of the U.S.'s operation. Their approval were recorded on a 6-point scale. But for clarity, and because the substance and statistical significance of the results are similar, the analysis below uses a binary measure (either approve or disapprove).

Do IOs influence Japanese approval of American war?

The analysis begins by testing the information theory's first claim that IOs raise support for U.S. military policy. Table 3 summarizes the results. Mirroring the analysis of American public opinion in Greico et al. (2011), it compares Japanese approval when both NATO and the UNSC oppose war against a situation in which both IOs recommend war, along with the difference in support between the two. As the theory predicts, IOs boost Japanese support for U.S. intervention. Survey #1 indicates that approval ratings are at 62 percent with the backing of IOs, while only 47 percent without. The difference, or the effect of obtaining IO authorization, is a 14 percentage point boost in public assent. Replicating this effect, Survey #2 similarly finds that the difference in Japanese approval due to the support of IOs is 19.2 points.

Table 3: IOs Increase Mass Approval for U.S. Military Action

	Percent Approval when the IOs...		Difference or the Effect of IOs [95% C.I.]
	Support War	Oppose War	
Survey #1	62.2	47.9	14.3 [10.8, 17.8]
Survey #2	66.4	47.1	19.2 [12.8, 25.6]

Note: This table gives the percentage of Japanese who approve of the U.S.'s use of force when NATO and the UN Security Council support war, when the two IOs oppose war, and the difference in approval between these two scenarios. N=3,053 in Survey #1, and N=893 in Survey #2.

Which IOs are the most persuasive and why?

To reiterate the theory, there are a few variants of the information theory that outline different reasons why IOs affect mass opinion. One version asserts that IOs comprised of a diverse membership (i.e. is a neutral institutions) are especially persuasive. Another version argues that conservative IOs, as measured by an IO's most distant pivotal member, have the greatest effect. Yet another version argues that IOs representing coalition of great powers are the most influential.

The proceeding analysis tests two main hypotheses that follow from these theories. First, the UNSC has a powerful effect on war approval: it is comprised of a more diverse group of countries, it has pivotal members (e.g. China and Russia) that are distant in their policy preferences, and it is comprised of the complete concert of global powers (i.e. the P5). On the other hand, NATO's effect should be less substantial for the reverse reasons: it is homogenous, closely tied to the U.S., and does not constitute a complete elite pact. Second, people who view an IO to be relatively diverse/neutral or distant/conservative should be more readily influenced by that IO. The first claim speaks to variation across

different IOs, while the latter is about the conditional effects an IO has across different individuals.

To begin, Table 4 displays the results from estimating the effects of NATO and the UNSC independent of each other, rather than their joint effect. Among the Japanese public, the UNSC has a significant but small effect (about 0.03 change in probability or a 3 percentage point change). Meanwhile, NATO has a substantially larger impact. NATO's endorsement causes a 12 point boost in approval of armed U.S. intervention. These results contradict the information theory. Despite the many reasons why the UNSC should have a large impact on people's opinions, it does not. Meanwhile, NATO is influential despite the fact that it lacks several of the properties that have been theorized to empower an IO.⁴³ These results are robust to accounting for whether the IOs' member countries are named or not, and whether the dependent variable is coded using the full 6-point scale (See Online Appendix).

The UNSC's insubstantial effect on public attitudes is troubling evidence for the information theories. Even more problematic, *the UNSC has a null effect among the subset of respondents who received a positive cue from NATO*. According to the information argument, NATO's positive cue should contain very little information about the merits of war because NATO's interests are closely aligned to the United States. Put another way, NATO's recommendation for war is not surprising at all because, of course, NATO would back the U.S. in going to war. Under such a condition, citizens should care more deeply

⁴³ The results combine data from both surveys, but splitting them apart produces the same results: a significant but small UNSC effect (2 to 5 percentage points) and a significant and large NATO effect (11 to 14 percentage points). This replicability speaks to the robustness of the results.

about (or learn more from) the more surprising cue (i.e. the UNSC’s position on war). Yet they do not. As reported in the bottom row of Table 4, the effect of a UNSC endorsement in such a scenario is -0.03 percentage points.

Table 4: NATO Affects Public Approval More than the UNSC

IO	Percent Approval when the IO...		Difference or the IO’s Effect [95% C.I.]
	Support War	Oppose War	
UNSC	58.8	55.6	3.3 [1.1, 5.4]
NATO	63.3	51.1	12.2 [10.0, 14.4]
UNSC*	63.1	63.5	-0.03 [-0.3, 2.7]

Note: This table gives the percentage of Japanese citizens who approve of the U.S.’s use of force when NATO and the UN Security Council support and oppose war, and the difference in approval between these two scenarios. N=7,852. UNSC indicates the effect of the UNSC under a condition in which NATO has endorsed intervention—i.e. the UNSC effect when respondents are given non-surprising and thus non-informative situation in which NATO backs the U.S.’s proposal for war. Data are from Surveys #1 and #2.*

There may be, however, an explanation for why the theory did not predict the UNSC null result: people may hold incorrect beliefs about the IOs’ membership preferences. For example, Japanese citizens might not perceive the UNSC to be a diverse IO that is ideologically distant from the U.S. The previous analysis of Japanese political knowledge, which showed that Japanese are largely familiar with NATO and the UN, imply this is unlikely. Furthermore, Online Appendix E shows that the results hold when accounting for citizen sophistication—and actually, the UNSC’s influence is even *smaller*

among sophisticated citizens, while NATO's effect is larger.⁴⁴ But to interrogate the potential effects of citizen ignorance even further, this study directly assesses citizens' perceptions of an IO's membership.

One way to measure an IO's membership preferences might be to examine state behavior. For example, scholars use UN General Assembly voting records to measure country preferences,⁴⁵ which could be used to calculate a diversity/neutrality or distance/conservativeness score. However, even if an IO is *objectively* diverse or distant, public perceptions might not match that fact. Given that the theory is about the effect of IOs on public opinion, it is thus more accurate to measure citizens' *subjective* evaluations an IO's membership. Because of space limitations, the analysis below focuses on the diversity/neutrality measure, but Online Appendix F shows that using the distance/conservative measure leads to the same conclusions.

The survey evaluated people's subjective beliefs about an IO's member-countries on two different dimensions: in terms of their values and in terms of their interests. This values-versus-interests distinction captures two major categories of causal factors in IR theory. More specifically, data from Survey #2 measured Japanese perceptions about various countries' human rights record and strategic relevance to Japan. The human rights variable captures a value dimension—liberal democratic values—that is relevant to the survey vignette, which is about a U.S. humanitarian intervention into a civil war to save

⁴⁴ Sophisticated citizens included those who were college educated, follow the news, and vote in elections.

⁴⁵ Chapman 2011, 85.

innocent lives. Likewise, the strategic relevance variable (i.e. is a particular country Japan's political ally) focuses on interstate level interests to be fit the foreign policy-based survey scenario.⁴⁶


Regarding human rights, respondents stated whether they agreed or disagreed that each of the following countries "respects human rights": Canada, Germany, the UK, China, and Russia.⁴⁷ For strategic relevance, respondents stated whether they agree or disagree that each of the same five countries is "Japan's political ally." Respondents received a UNSC "diversity score" from the variance in her responses regarding China, Russia, and the UK, and a NATO diversity score from the variances of the UK, Canada, and Germany.

Figure 1 reports the distribution of diversity scores for each IO. The histograms show that about 15 to 25 percent of Japanese perceive the UNSC to be homogenous (a zero on the x-axis), while the remaining respondents believe that the UNSC contains some degree of diversity. In stark contrast, about 70 percent of the sample views NATO as homogenous. These results corroborate the assumption that Japanese view the UNSC as relatively diverse, while viewing NATO as relatively homogenous. Thus, the fact that the UNSC has little influence on Japanese support for U.S. war is unlikely to be a result of their misperceptions of the UNSC's member countries.

⁴⁶ The human rights and political ally measures are specific to this study, but the focus on values versus interests could be used by future researchers of membership heterogeneity

⁴⁷ Measuring each IO's *complete* membership is preferable but unfortunately overly costly and taxing for survey takers. The countries thus includes two UNSC members, two NATO members, and one that is in both.

Figure 1: Japanese Perceive the UNSC as Diverse, NATO as Homogenous



Note: These histograms show the distribution of people's beliefs about NATO and the UNSC's membership diversity in terms of human rights practices and political relationships with Japan. Higher values on the x-axis correspond to the perception that an IO is more diverse. A normal density plot (red line) is overlaid on a histogram (bars). N=3,587. Data are from Survey #2.

The analysis conducts one final test of the IO diversity/neutrality hypothesis. It first creates a *Diversity* variable for each respondent regarding NATO and the UNSC. Based on a median split of the data reported in Figure 1, *Diversity* equals 1 if the respondent believes the IO is relatively diverse and equals 0 if the IO is relatively uniform.⁴⁸ The analysis then applies a probit regression in which *Approval* is regressed on *NATO*, $Diversity^{NATO}$, $NATO * Diversity^{NATO}$ (the interaction of the two), and demographic and attitudinal control variables.⁴⁹ The control variables help to statistically account for factors that might correlate with both people's perceptions an IO's diversity and the dependent variable.⁵⁰ I conduct a similar analysis for the UNSC, and complete this process using both values and interests versions of the *Diversity* variable.

From the regression analysis, Table 5 reports the estimates in terms of marginal probabilities. The theory hypothesizes that the interaction terms are be positive: a greater perception of IO diversity should increase the IO's effect. However, all statistical models

⁴⁸ Converting *Diversity* into a binary variable helps to overcome the lack of common support in the interaction term model (Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu 2017), which is problematic given that perceptions of *Diversity* are unequally distributed.

⁴⁹ Control variables: gender, age, education, ideology, past voting, cosmopolitanism, isolationism, and exceptionalism. In addition to standard demographics, dispositional variables are included as they have been shown to be important to explaining foreign policy attitudes (E.g. Herrmann and Visser 1999; Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer, and Renshon *Forthcoming*).

⁵⁰ Even though the IO cue is experimentally varied, *Diversity* is not, so it is appropriate to include control variables.

show that *Diversity* is an insignificant moderator. The coefficients on *NATO*Diversity* and *UNSC*Diverse* are sometimes negative and sometimes positive but always substantively small and statistically insignificant (gray background in Table 3). Whether analyzing differences across NATO and the UNSC, or differences among individuals based on their perception of IO diversity, the data reject the claim that more heterogeneous IOs are more influential in swaying foreign public opinion. Instead, it reinforces the main analysis by showing that NATO has a significant effect on public opinion, while the UNSC does not. NATO's effect is about 12 to 15 points (i.e. the predicted probability changes of 0.12 and 0.15 in models 4 and 2). The magnitude of these effects are even larger than that of people's ideology (*Conservative*) and disposition for isolationist foreign policy (*Isolationism*), which have about a 7 point negative effect.

Table 5: The Effect of IOs on Public Approval is not Conditional on Perceptions of Membership Diversity/Neutrality

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Dependent Variable: Approval of U.S.</i>			
	<i>Diversity = Human Rights</i>		<i>Diversity = Political Relations</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>UNSC</i>	0.016		0.019	
<i>Diversity</i> ^{UNSC}	0.074		0.078	
<i>UNSC*Diversity</i>	0.061		0.066	
<i>NATO</i>		0.152		0.122
<i>Diversity</i> ^{NATO}		0.040		-0.025
<i>NATO*Diversity</i>		-0.043		0.048
<i>Female</i>	-0.064	-0.081	-0.058	-0.081
<i>Age</i>	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
<i>College</i>	-0.008	-0.008	-0.001	-0.010
<i>Conservative</i>	0.065	0.068	0.059	0.068
<i>Voter</i>	0.050	0.060	0.056	0.063
<i>Cosmopolitan</i>	-0.026	-0.032	-0.025	-0.032
<i>Isolationist</i>	-0.069	-0.076	-0.075	-0.076
<i>Exceptionalist</i>	0.009	-0.011	0.009	-0.011

Note: This table reports the marginal effects from four separate probit regressions, conditional on other variables being held at their means. The dependent variable is Approval, which takes the value of 1 if the respondents approves of U.S. military intervention and 0 if she disapproves. Estimates significant at the 0.05 level are in bold. N=1,407. Data are from Survey #2.

Can IOs reassure war-weary citizens?

The theory implies that the value of an IO's endorsement is highest among foreigners who are *skeptical* of a military superpower, or believes that a superpower is *imprudent* when it comes to the use of armed force. These observers should be especially intent on obtaining political reassurances, especially from an IO like the UNSC, which can serve as a credible check on U.S. military power. In contrast, NATO, which is often seen as the U.S.'s close partner, should be less of a credible check.


Data from Survey #1 allow us to test this argument, as it measured each respondent's opinion about whether the U.S. abuses or wisely manages its military might. Specifically, survey-takers answered the following question: "Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 'The U.S. generally makes good decisions about using military force in other countries.'" From their answers, respondents were grouped into three categories: people who agree, who neither agree nor disagree, and who disagree. These three groups were then labeled as those who believe the U.S. to be *Prudent*, *Neutral*, or *Imprudent*.

Figure 2 gives the effect of IOs among these groups. Consistent with the information theory, the combined endorsement effect of the UNSC and NATO is largest among those who view the U.S. as the most imprudent. The effect of IOs is about 17 points among the *Imprudent* group (triangle icon), 9 points among the *Neutral* group (square icon), and only about 6 points among the *Prudent* group (circle icon).

Figure 3 also examines whether this effect varies between the UNSC and NATO. Contrary to the information theories, the more skeptical the audience, the more they turn

to NATO for political reassurance. Among Japanese who believe that the U.S. is a *Prudent* super power, both NATO and the UNSC have about a 4 point effect, though neither effect is statistically significant. Among those who have *Neutral* opinions about the U.S., NATO's effect is about 9 points while the UNSC's effect remains small. And finally, among those who believe that the U.S. is an *imprudent* military power, NATO's effect is about 13 points while the UNSC effect is about 5 points. Skeptical Japanese are indeed more influenced by the cues of IOs, but primarily by NATO rather than the UNSC.

Figure 2: Skeptics of U.S. Military Power turn to NATO for Reassurance



Note: This figure shows the effect of an IO endorsement on Japanese approval of U.S. intervention, sub-setting by whether people believe the U.S. is a prudent, neutral, or imprudent military power. A 0.1 effect indicates a 10 percentage point increase in approval. Prudent (N=1,842), Neutral (N=5,288), and Imprudent (N=5,103). 95% confidence intervals are reported. Data are from Survey #1.

Discussion: Alternative Explanations, Generalizability, and Implications

Why would powerful countries risk limiting their autonomy by pursuing an IO's permission to wage war? Informational theorists argue that IOs enable governments to win the policy support of foreign citizens. By testing the theory in the case of Japanese opinion on U.S. military intervention, this study reaches several conclusions. Consistent with the information theories, U.S., NATO and the UN are salient in the news surrounding U.S. wars; Japanese citizens are knowledgeable of the two IOs; and the endorsement of IOs raise approval for the use of force. But contrary to the theory, NATO exerts a stronger influence than the UNSC, and furthermore, an IO's membership diversity neither affects its overall persuasiveness nor its ability to reassure citizens who are fearful of U.S. war mongering. In sum, the theory correctly identifies the domestic channels through which IOs matter, but it misses its mark on vital questions regarding *how* and *which* IOs win policy supporters.

Material Capabilities and Social Representation as Alternative Explanations

By providing a much-needed test of an important theory, this article shows that there is an opportunity for researchers to develop new theory on how IOs shape foreign policy preferences. While a full theoretical elaboration and empirical test exceeds this paper's scope, two preliminary alternative explanations are worth exploring.

First, people might care more about whether a military operation will be *successful*,⁵¹ which is a function of whether an operation is backed by an IO with the *capability* of completing its proposed task.⁵² This would explain why NATO, an organization built upon a military alliance, has a greater effect on public approval than the UNSC, whose votes of approval do not necessarily correspond with military action.⁵³ The hypothesis here is that IOs that have greater military and economic resources should be most persuasive in garnering policy support.

The second explanation turns to ideational considerations. Japanese might care more about cues from political actors with whom they identify, or members of their “in group.” Research drawing from various traditions argues that like-minded or identity-sharing actors can influence, persuade, and shape the policy preferences of one another.⁵⁴ As a liberal democratic country, Japanese citizens are likely to identify with the countries in NATO rather than the more diffuse group of countries in the UNSC. This sense of community could also explain why NATO influences Japanese public opinion independent of the UNSC, but not vice versa. Thus, the main hypothesis here is that the more citizens

⁵¹ Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009.

⁵² Bush and Prather *forthcoming*.

⁵³ Another material explanation is that Japanese might view a UN intervention as more costly because Japan historically contributes to UN operations. But as discussed, Japan increasingly assists NATO activities as well.

⁵⁴ Mercer 1995 and McDermott 2009 give psychological perspectives. Herrmann and Shannon 2001; Johnston 2001; and Finnemore 2003 present social and constructivist views.

identify with an IO and its member countries, the more those citizens will value that IO's policy recommendations.⁵⁵

The success-capability and social identity explanations are not mutually exclusive, and future research should systematically evaluate their validity, but there are two indications that the social explanation is more persuasive. To begin, the social theory provides a compelling explanation for a puzzling set of empirical findings by Tago and Ikeda (2015). The authors evaluate a survey experiment also on Japanese opinion on U.S. uses of military force but that only looks at the UNSC. They analyze approval of the U.S. under four conditions: the U.S. (1) receives unanimous UNSC approval, (2) receives UNSC approval but with Russia and China abstaining and four non-permanent members voting no, (3) does not receive UNSC approval due to Russia and China's veto, and (4) does not attempt to receive UNSC approval due to anticipated opposition. They find that the first three conditions receive indistinguishably higher levels of public support than the fourth. The authors attribute this to an "A for effort" effect (i.e. governments receive a public boost so long as they *attempt* to receive UNSC authorization). An alternative interpretation from a social identity perspective is that popular approval of the use of force increases so long as the U.S. receives the approval of its fellow liberal democratic countries like the UK and France, while the views of out-group countries like China and Russia are discounted. On the other hand, NATO's military capacity cannot explain this variation.

⁵⁵ Kertzer and Zeitsoff 2017 show, however, that social cues from non-identifying actors can still be powerful.

Second, the social explanation helps to make sense of why citizens most critical of U.S. military power would seek political reassurance from NATO rather than the UNSC (Figure 3). It implies that Japanese are looking for reassurance in the context of whether war would be appropriate in the eyes of fellow democratic states. In contrast, the success-capabilities explanation predicts the opposite. Skeptics who believe that the U.S. lacks prudence when it comes to the use of military force are unlikely to want reassurance from NATO, which would be in effect amplifying the military capacity of the militarily irresponsible country.

Generalizability

Japan is a policy relevant case suitable for theory testing and is thus useful to study in and of itself, but researchers might wonder how the results speak to other countries. While countries differ on countless dimensions, Japan would likely be a middling case in terms of the effect of IO cues on public approval. First, there are strong cross-cutting forces in modern Japan-U.S. relations. Japan is a close liberal democratic ally of the U.S. that generally expresses affinity toward Americans, but it is also anti-militaristic and wary of entrapment by overly hawkish U.S. policies.⁵⁶ Japan would thus not be an obvious case for being particularly susceptible or immune to the external influence of IOs with regards to their opinions about the U.S.

Second, Japan's beliefs about whether the U.S. has a positive or negative impact on the international system (and therefore its concern about consequences of U.S.

⁵⁶ Izumikawa 2010, 129-32.

intervention) is close to the average of dozens of other countries. In a 2010-11 BBC World Service Poll, the difference in percentages of Japanese who believed the U.S. to be a positive versus negative influence in the world was 25 points, compared to an average of 18 points among twenty-five other countries representing various regions and regime types.⁵⁷ Countries more pessimistic about the U.S. like Germany (-7 points) and China (-20 points) might value an IO's authorization even more than Japan. In contrast, countries with more optimistic views about the U.S. like Italy (38 points) and South Korea (55 points) will presumably care less about an IO's second opinion.

Further Implications

Getting the story right with regards to whether and how IOs sway mass opinion has theoretical and practical ramifications. This study buttresses the informational theorists' call to take seriously domestic political explanations for why countries value international institutions. The findings, however, also reveal that there is still much to learn about the reasons why international institutions hold legitimacy in the eyes of domestic actors. The information theory gives a potential answer: legitimacy might be a function of an IO's preference distribution and ability to shed light on the consequences of a policy. This article casts doubt on this perspective and offers two candidate alternative explanations relating to material capability and social identity. It ultimately finds more promising the social perspective, which argues that IOs can persuade depending on their ability to harness

⁵⁷ Complete list in Online Appendix G.

people's identification with other nations. Future research should carefully elaborate and test this alternative view.

Understanding the link between IOs and public opinion has policy implications as well. Reflecting on the Rwandan Genocide, UN Secretary General Kofi Anan asked:

If, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of States had been prepared to act in defense of the Tutsi population, but did not receive prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold?

As this observation makes so vividly clear, governments preparing to wage war may like to first acquire the backing of an IO, but doing so is not free. It is thus imperative to fully grasp the potential benefits of obtaining an IO's policy support and which particular IOs can grant them.

References

- Abdelal, Rawl, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnson, and Rose McDermott. 2009. *Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Aldrich, John H., Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Reifler, and Kristin Thompson Sharp. 2006. "Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection." *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 (1):477-502.
- Baum, Matthew A. and Philip B.K. Potter. 2015. *War and Democratic Constraint: How the Public Influences Foreign Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Berger, Thomas U. 2003. *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Brooks, Deborah J. and Benjamin A. Valentino. "A War of One's Own: Understanding the Gender Gap in Support for War." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 75(2): 27-86.
- Bobrow, Davis B. 1989. "Japan in the World: Opinion from Defeat to Success." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33 (4): 571-604.
- Bush, Sarah, and Amaney Jamal. 2015. "Anti-Americanism, Authoritarian Politics, and Attitudes about Women's Representation: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Jordan." *International Studies Quarterly* 59 (1): 34-45.
- Bush, Sarah, and Lauren Prather. *Forthcoming*. "Who's There? Election Observer Identity and the Local Credibility of Elections." *International Organization*.
- Chapman, Terrence L. 2011. *Securing Approval: Domestic Politics & Multilateral Authorization for War*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

- Claude, Inis. 1966. "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations." *International Organization* 20 (3): 367-79.
- Fang, Songying. 2008. "The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (2): 304-321.
- Finnemore, Martha. 2003. *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Gelpi, Christopher, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler. 2009. *Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Greico, Joseph M., Christopher Gelpi, Jason Reifler, and Peter D. Feaver. 2011. "Let's Get a Second Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War." *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2): 563-83.
- Goldsmith, Benjamin E. and Yasaku Horiuchi. 2009. "Spinning the Globe? U.S. Public Diplomacy and Foreign Public Opinion." *American Journal of Political Science* 71 (3): 863-75.
- Goldsmith, Benjamin E. and Yasaku Horiuchi. 2012. "In Search of Soft Power: Does Foreign Public Opinion Matter for US Foreign Policy?" *World Politics* 64(3) 555-585.
- Haimuller, Jens, Jonathan Mummolo, and Yiqing Xu. 2016. "How much should we trust estimates from multiplicative interaction models? Simple tools to improve empirical practice." Stanford University Working Paper, Available at: SSRN Electronic Journal, <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2739221>.

- Herrmann, Richard K. and Vaughn P. Shannon. 2001. "Defending International Norms: The Role of Obligation, Material Interest, and Perceptions in Decision Making." *International Organization* 55(3): 621-54.
- Herrmann, Richard K. and Penny S. Visser. 1999. "Mass Public Decisions to Go to War: A Cognitive-Interactionist Framework." *American Political Science Review* 93 (3): 553-573.
- Hurd, Ian. 2007. *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Izumikawa, Yasuhiro. 2010. "Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and Realist Constraints on Japan's Security Policy." *International Security* 35 (2): 123-60.
- Johnson, Chalmers. 1975. "Japan: Who Governs? An Essay on Official Bureaucracy." *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 2 (1): 1-28.
- Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2001. "Treating International Institutions and Social Environment." *International Studies Quarterly* 45(4): 487-515.
- Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2012. "What (If Anything) Does East Asia Tell Us about International Relations Theory?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 15: 54-78.
- Katzenstein, Peter J. (eds.). 2008. *Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and External Dimensions*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Kertzer, Joshua D. and Ryan Brutger. 2016. "Decomposing Audience Cost: Bringing the Audience Back into Audience Cost Theory." *American Journal of Political Science* 60 (1): 234-49.

- Kertzer, Joshua D. and Thomas Zeitzoff. 2017. "A Bottom-Up Theory of Public Opinion about Foreign Policy." *American Journal of Political Science* 61 (3): 543-58.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. *Information and Legislative Organization*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Lipsy, Phillip. 2015. "Explaining Institutional Change: Policy Areas, Outside Options, and the Bretton Woods Institutions." *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (2): 341-56.
- McDermott, Rose. 2009. "Psychological Approaches to Identity: Experimentation and Application." In *Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists*, edited by Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Mercer, Jonathan. 1995. "Anarchy and Identity." *International Organization* 49(2): 229-52.
- Midford, Paul. 2006. *Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism: Implications for Japan's Security Strategy*. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center Washington.
- Midford, Paul. 2011. *Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism?* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Murphy, Sean D. 1996. *Humanitarian Intervention*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Naoi, Megumi, and Ikuo Kume. 2011. "Explaining Mass Support for Agricultural Protectionism: Evidence from a Survey Experiment During the Global

- Recession.” *International Organization* 65 (4): 771-95.
- Naoi, Megumi, and Ikuo Kume. 2015. “Workers or Consumers? A Survey Experiment on the Duality of Citizens’ Interests in the Politics of Trade.” *Comparative Political Studies* 48 (10): 1293-1317.
- Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 2004. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: PublicAffairs.
- Pape, Robert A. 2005. “Soft Balancing against the United States.” *International Security* (30)1: 7-45.
- Quek, Kai. 2017. “Rationalist Experiments on War.” *Political Science and Research Methods* 5 (1): 123-42.
- Risse-Kappan, Thomas. 1991. “Public Opinion, Domestic Structures, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies.” *World Politics* 43(4): 479-512.
- Shinoda, Tomohito. 2007. “Becoming More Realistic in the Post-Cold War: Japan’s Changing Media and Public Opinion on National Security.” *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 8 (2): 171-90.
- Stein, Arthur. 1990. *Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstances and Choice in International Relations*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Tago, Atsushi and Maki Ikeda. 2015. “An ‘A’ for Effort: Experimental Evidence on UN Security Council Engagement and Support for US Military Action in Japan.” *British Journal of Political Science* 45(2): 391-410.

- Tingley, Dustin, and Michael Tomz. 2012. "How does the UN Security Council Influence Public Opinion?" Working paper, Stanford University. Available at: <http://web.stanford.edu/~tomz/>
- Tingley, Dustin, and Stephanie Wang. 2010. "Belief Updating in Sequential Games of Two-Sided Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study of a Crisis Bargaining Model." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 5 (3): 243-255.
- Tingley, Dustin H., and Barbara F. Walter. 2011. "The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building: An Experimental Approach." *International Organization* 65 (Spring): 343-65.
- Thompson, Alexander. 2009. *Channels of Power: The UN Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq*. Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Tomz, Michael. 2007. "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach." *International Organization* 61 (4): 821-40.
- Voeten, Erik. 2001. "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action." *American Political Science Review* 95 (4): 845-58.
- Voeten, Erik. 2005. "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force." *International Organization* (3): 527-57.
- Weingast, Barry. 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of law." *American Political Science Review* 92 (2): 245-63.
- Yarhi-Milo, Karen, Joshua Kertzer, and Jonathan Renshon. *Forthcoming*. "Tying Hands, Sinking Cost, and Leaders Attributes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.