

# Autocracies of the World, 1950-2012

Version 1.0

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## Overview

This dataset classifies the world's political regimes, primarily focusing on distinctions among different types of autocracies, between 1950 and 2012.




Figure 1: Proportions of regime types from 1950-2012 using this dataset.

Over the last decade, academic work on political institutions has placed more focus on differences within autocracies—a group of polities that were long treated as a homogenous pool defined by “lack of democracy.” Advancing the literature, contributions such as Geddes (2003) have observed and delineated differences in the governing institutions, power holders, and nature of governance among various autocratic governments. Such studies have given rise to a wealth of insightful research.

Attempts to study autocracies in a larger-scale, quantitative manner have resulted in the creation of datasets that classify countries over time using varying taxonomies. The field of extant datasets is relatively new and still developing. (For examples, see Wahman et al. [2013]; Geddes et al. [2011]; and Cheibub et al. [2010].) We seek to contribute to this research agenda with this first edition of a new dataset.<sup>1</sup>

Our dataset includes several features that we believe are quite useful. These include:

- *Avoiding “missing,” “transitional,” and hybrid classifications.* Many countries have tumultuous years of instability, transition, and flux. However, this does not eliminate the fact that a government of some sort exists during these years. Substantial efforts were made to figure out

<sup>1</sup> This dataset partially builds upon data used in Magaloni (2008).

the institutions underlying transitional regimes. For example, a military government can oversee a transition to democracy. Thus, rather than leave certain observations blank, we create a separate variable for transitional years to allow researcher the flexibility of deciding whether or not those observations are relevant to their analysis. (The only exception is Somalia from 1991 to 2006, where the polity seems truly “stateless.”)

Similarly, we sought to eliminate hybrid regime classifications. There are high quality datasets available for scholars who are interested analyzing hybrid authoritarian regimes (such as Geddes et al. [2011]). We have found, however, that hybrid classifications often (1) hinder useful quantitative analysis or (2) are actually essentially one type of regime, but only appear hybrid due to certain window-dressing institutional features. Finding the “essential” regime type seems to be a valuable contribution.

- *Providing two novel and objective measures of personalism.* Currently available datasets recognize that certain autocratic regimes are highly “personalistic” and have created a personalist regime type. We agree that personalism is an important feature of many autocracies, but we depart from previous work in our belief that personalism is a quality distinct from the regime’s institutions and is a concept that should be operationalized as its own variable. In other words, all autocracies have some degree of personalism: a military regime, for example, could have a very non-personalistic, corporate leadership or it can have a highly personalistic general as the head of state. In addition to treating personalism as a distinct concept, we have observed that measures of personalism lack objective and clear criteria for measurement. Most existing datasets rely on general consensus of the qualitative literature to identify a personalistic regime. Given these two concerns, we provide two measures of personalism (detailed below) in this dataset.
- *Classifying through 2012.* In covering up to 2012, the dataset will hopefully retain some longevity as other complementary datasets, many of which end in the mid-2000s, are extended into more recent years. We also hope to update this dataset periodically with more years and useful covariates.

## Summary of Variables

Several sets of variables come in pairs: *variable\_r* and *variable\_nr*. These correspond with rounded and non-rounded values. The rationale and methodology behind these pairs of data is provided in the section entitled “Transition Years and Rounding.”

<i>cyear</i>	Numeric expression of country-year, made by concatenating <i>ccode</i> and <i>year</i> .
<i>cntyr</i>	Alphanumeric expression of country-year, made by concatenating <i>scode</i> and <i>year</i> .
<i>ccode</i>	Numeric country codes, based on the Correlates of War dataset.
<i>scode</i>	Three-letter country codes, based on the Correlates of War dataset.
<i>country</i>	String version of country.
<i>year</i>	Four-digit calendar year.
<i>un_region</i>	Region, based on classifications by the United Nations.
<i>un_continent</i>	Continent, based on classifications by the United Nations.
<i>reg_id</i>	A unique number identifying a specific regime in a specific country. The number is created by combining the country code ( <i>ccode</i> ) with a basic regime count in the country in the following manner: $100*(ccode) + \text{running total}$ . For example, the first country-year in the data for Haiti (country code is 41) is 4101, and changes to 4102 the year that regime type changes in the country. Note that this ID is created using the non-rounded regime classifications.
<i>demo_r</i>	A dummy variable for whether a given country-year has a democratic regime, using the rounding rule. (Note that these classifications do not necessarily align with a strict threshold based on Polity scores.)
<i>demo_nr</i>	A dummy variable for whether a given country-year has a democratic regime, without rounding. (Note that these classifications do not necessarily align with a strict threshold based on Polity scores.)
<i>regime_r</i>	The regime type of a given country-year, using the rounding rule so that the regime type that constituted the majority (or plurality) of the year is used. The list of potential regimes includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Democracy</li><li>• Multiparty</li><li>• Single party</li><li>• Military</li></ul>

- Monarchy

Definitions of each are provided in the “Classifying Autocracies” section. Note that these classifications are mutually exclusive for any given country-year.

*regime\_nr* The regime type of a given country-year, in which the classification is based on the regime type that exists at the end of the year. This is the more “conventional” approach of other regime datasets.

*duration\_r* The age of a regime up to the given country-year, using the rounding rule. The count begins at 1.

*duration\_nr* The age of a regime up to the given country-year, without rounding. The first year in which a new regime takes hold is recorded as 1, regardless of when in the year this new regime appears.

*personal1* A three-point measure of the country-year’s regime’s degree of personalism. This is based on the seven-point *xconst* (executive constraints) scale of the Polity IV dataset. The following conversion was used:

<i>xconst</i>		<i>personal</i>
1	Highly personal	2
2-4	Moderately personal	1
5-7	Weakly/not personal	0

In contrast to *personal2*, whenever Polity IV does not provide an *xconst* measure (periods of transition, interregnum, or occupation), this measure is left blank.

*personal2* Identical to *personal1*, except missing values are filled in. Whenever possible, missing values are imputed using the *xconst* measures that do exist for a given regime. When a regime has the same recorded *xconst* throughout, this value is used for missing values. When *xconst* is not the same throughout a given regime, values are prorated to fill middle years and based on the closest *xconst* measure to fill years that are on either end of the regime’s lifespan.

*lindex* A newly constructed measure of personalism within each regime. (See the “Personalism” subsection for a substantive explanation of this metric.) The variable is essentially a Herfindahl index (sum of squared shares) using the column *exname*.

For a given country-year in a unique regime (see *reg\_id*), the following calculation is made:

$$\sum_{i=1}^m \left(\frac{exec_i}{n}\right)^2$$

where  $n$  is the age of the regime up to that year, and  $exec$  is the number of years that a unique executive  $i$  (out of a total  $m$  executives up to that year) has led the regime. As such, a regime led by only one person up through that year yields a personalism index of 1. A theoretical scenario where leadership changes every single year would yield  $1/n$ .

These calculations are made using the non-rounded values. We note that this is a relatively sensitive measure in the early/formative years of an individual regime, but we propose this is a useful way of considering personalism as an evolving attribute of a regime over time. More discussion on the relative merits of this measure can be found below.

<i>exname</i>	The name of the executive head of state in the country-year. Country years from 1950 to 2008 are based on Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010).
<i>change</i>	A dummy for whether a regime change occurred in this country-year. (Note that in cases such as coups and counter-coups, such changes can occur without the overarching regime type changing.)
<i>tdate</i>	The date a country underwent transition to a new regime type. The format is MM.DD.YYYY, and this date is used in the rounding rule (see the section entitled “Transitional Years and Rounding”). When a specific month or date cannot be identified, “00” is used.
<i>trans</i>	A dummy variable indicating whether the country was in the midst of transition, as noted by the Polity IV dataset.
<i>occup</i>	A dummy variable indicating whether the country was occupied by a foreign power in the given year, as noted by the Polity IV dataset.
<i>interreg</i>	A dummy variable indicating whether the country was in the midst of interregnum in the given year, as noted by the Polity IV dataset.

## Inclusion Criteria and Definitions

This data provides country-year classifications of regime types from 1950 to 2012. It proceeds in four steps. First, the inclusion of countries is determined using rule based on population size. Second, all country years are classified as either democratic or autocratic. Third, all autocracies are classified into mutually exclusive regimes: military, monarchy, single party, and multiparty regimes. Fourth, all autocracies are given two personalism scores.

To code regime type, we primarily focus on three aspects of the political regime: source of policy making, institutions or rules that structure intra-elite interaction and competition, and composition and selection of the executive and political leaders.

### **Inclusion**

Following the convention of the Polity IV dataset, we only classify countries with populations greater than 500,000. Therefore, a handful of countries such as St. Kitts and Nevis (population approximately 53,000) and Tuvalu (population approximately 10,000) are omitted.

### **Democracy vs. Autocracy**

Following our three criteria on regime types, we code a country as democratic if it meets all of the following criteria.

1. A civilian government (as opposed to military or royal court) provides the main source of policy making.
2. Political leaders form multiple and competitive parties, and the parties interact and run the government through a legislature.
3. The executive is institutionally constrained or checked by other parts of the government.
4. Elections are used to select the political leadership, and they are largely open, competitive, and free and fair.

These criteria focus on how the governing elite are selected and the institutional features of the government. The criteria do not include features of what is popularly termed “liberal” or “illiberal” democracy, such as laws regarding social rights and civil liberties. Additionally, we opt against using a strict threshold rule based on Polity IV to determine which countries are democratic or not. Some Polity scores are mentioned when resolving discrepancies in classifications and are helpful in some more extreme circumstances (e.g., a country-year coded as -8 is probably non-democratic), but case-by-case considerations are made to determine the existence of democratic institutions and practices. Where our coding of democracy is discrepant with currently available data, we provide a justification for our coding in this codebook’s appendix. In general, we depart from two commonly used datasets for distinguishing democracies from autocracies in the following ways:

- Our coding of democracy mirrors Przeworski et al. (2000) and subsequently Cheibub et al. (2010) in many respects, but with three important differences.

1. Following Geddes (2003, 2011), we include the criteria that elections to select the political leadership are largely free and fair. Systematic and widespread observance of extra-institutional tactics would indicate autocracy.
  2. We consider the constraints on the executive to generally be a feature of democracies (though by no means do we suggest that autocracies experience no executive constraints; see the variable *personal1*). It is not enough that multiple parties are allowed to freely and fairly compete for political leadership positions if the executive has the *de facto* power to override, oust, or manipulate other branches of government like the legislature or courts.
  3. We do not institute the alternation rule for new democracies (Przeworski et al. 2000: 23-29). The alternation rule dictates that new democracies should continue to be coded as autocracies until an opposition party wins power over the executive or government because many autocratic governments might only hold elections because they knew the opposition would never win. We believe that by including the above to criteria—that elections must be largely free and fair, and that the executive must be constrained—we can rely on more precise measures of true democracy, and thus not need to rely on the alternation rule. Moreover, other studies have also questioned the rule’s assertion of avoiding Type II errors (Ulfelder 2006, Wahman forthcoming), which is a key justification to the rule’s use.
- The components underlying Polity IV’s composite score are weighted somewhat arbitrarily and may not be fully compatible with the classifications we seek to make here. For example, it is left unexplained why regional/ethnic lines are not considered legitimate political splits, pulling down a country’s overall score. The very heavy emphasis on executive constraints also causes many young or weaker democracies that have strong executives to be classified as autocratic if using a standard threshold of 7 or more.

### *Dealing with Discrepancies*

Many of the initial democracy/autocracy classifications were straightforward and consistent with extant datasets. However, in cases where our initial classification differed with others, we deferred to Polity when the provided score was clearly democratic or autocratic. For example, Cheibub et al. classify Guatemala from 1958-1962 under Ydigoras as a presidential democracy. We categorize his rule as autocratic (specifically militaristic), buoyed by Polity’s rating of these years as -5 or -6.

We realize that theoretical debate on what constitutes democracy will likely remain unresolved; our definition is only one of many. For the sake of transparency, any and all discrepancies between our classifications and those of Cheibub et al. (2010) and Geddes et al. (2011) are included in the Appendix with brief justifications for each case.



## Classifying Autocracies

Once we divide the world's regimes into democracies and autocracies, the next step is to categorize the different forms of autocratic governments. This dataset features four types: monarchy, military, single party, and multiparty. These definitions are expanded upon those given in Magaloni (2008). We restate here that we focus on the source of policy making, structure of elite interaction and competition, and the selection and composition of the political leadership.

### *Monarchy*

Monarchies are regime in which

the dictator is selected among the members of a royal or dynastical family in charge of making the principal decisions, including choosing the king's successor. Some contemporary monarchies rule with multiple political parties and parliaments. However, the locus of power remains within the royal or dynastic family and, unlike competitive party dictatorships, the dictator's seat is not opened to political contestation. (Magaloni 2008: 731)

Importantly, a country may have a king and not be classified as a monarchy if the source of policy making lies elsewhere, such as in the case of symbolic monarchies like contemporary Britain and Thailand.

### *Military*

As noted in Magaloni (2008), "the key distinctive trait of military regimes is that the armed forces control access to the principal positions of power," and even if political parties exist, "the dictator and his critical ruling coalition share power through the institution of the armed forces rather than the party" (731). We are thus concerned with regimes where *effective* control is primarily held by the military. Importantly, an executive with a military background is *not* a sufficient condition for a regime to be deemed militaristic. Instead, the military must have effective control over both political leadership positions (often evinced by the loading of military officers into leadership positions) and state policy.

### *Single party*

In a single party regime, all politics are conducted under the banner of a single, civilian party. Much of the time, the regime also constitutionally prohibits all but the one government-supported party. If other parties exist, they are simply facades for the regime. To operationalize, "an autocratic regime is a single party when political parties exist and exactly 100% of the legislature is composed of members of one ruling party" (Magaloni 2008: 732).

### *Multiparty*

Multiparty regimes in our dataset capture a class of autocracies in which a ruling party allows (generally via the constitution) opposition groups to form parties and participate in elections and the legislature. Politics are highly biased in favor of the ruling party, but competition is real. Classification rules also include the condition that "parties other than the ruling one have representation in the Parliament" (Magaloni 2008: 732).

Some scholars use the terms “electoral autocracies” (Linz 2000, Diamond 2002) and “competitive authoritarian regimes” (Levitsky and Way 2010) to describe this similar class of autocracies. Meanwhile, others distinguish hegemonic, dominant party, and competitive authoritarian regimes, among others, based on the degree to which elections are contested and the degree to which the opposition controls parts of the government (Howard and Roessler 2006; Magaloni 2006). Also note that Geddes does not distinguish between single party and multiparty regimes, opting to call them all “party” regimes.

The key features of our definition of multiparty autocracy are that it (1) focuses on institutional features and does not encapsulate the regime’s respect for civil liberties, such as in the case of competitive authoritarianism defined by Levitsky and Way and (2) captures the entire range of opposition participation in politics, rather than drawing distinctions between regimes in which the opposition groups control, for example, 20% versus 45% of the legislative seats. To elaborate on this second point using the language of latent variables, we view electoral and multiparty contestation as a concept that ranges from low to high. If it were possible to precisely classify regimes along this scale and distinguish the different types, then researchers can gain more information from the data. But given that measurement of this latent concept is imprecise, we believe that concerns about measurement error outweigh the potential gains from finer-grained classification.

### *Personalism*

We conceive of personalism in two different ways. One is the degree of constraints imposed on the executive: The fewer institutional constraints on the executive’s actions, the more personalist the autocratic regime. Second is the degree to which a particular regime is associated with a single leader: An autocratic regime overseen by a single ruler is highly personalist, and this decreases as a single regime experiences (regular) leadership changes. The less a particular regime is tied to specific individuals, the less personalist it becomes.<sup>2</sup>

Important to these approaches is that they apply to all forms of autocratic rule in varying degrees. Therefore, instead of making “personalist” a separate autocratic category, we measure these dimensions of personalism for all non-democracies. Refer to the “Summary of Variables” section to see the methodology behind the dataset’s two measurements of personalism. The measure based on Polity focuses on executive constraints in a given country-year, while the leader-based measure gives a more holistic view of personalism based on the prominence of leaders in a given regime up through that point in time.

An illustrative example of the leader-based personalism measure is Communist China. China is classified a single party autocracy from 1950 to 2012. This is a generally undisputed characterization of the regime’s institutions. However, the degree of personalism within the regime has varied over the years. Mao Zedong initiated the single party regime in 1949 and remained Chairman of the Communist Party of China until late 1976, at which point the country gradually transitioned to a system of regularized leadership change which now appears quite stable (and has experienced several subsequent chairmen). Hence,

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<sup>2</sup> For the more common definition of a “personalist regime,” refer to Geddes (2003: 53).

China under Mao from 1950 through 1975, China would be considered “perfectly” personalist (where the index is 1). However, through both additional leaders and additional years they spend in power, Mao’s personalist legacy is diluted over time. This dataset hence reports China’s level of leader-based personalism in 2012 as 0.298. The substantial variation in leader-based personalism within this single regime speaks to the merit of our new measure being a component of all autocracies.

### *Discrepancies*

Once again, we note that any discrepancies between our autocratic classifications and those of Geddes et al. (2011) and Cheibub et al. (2010) are provided in the Appendix with short explanations.

### **Transitional Years and Rounding**

States and regimes come and go. New states enter the dataset upon their independence (and not upon self-government, though the two are often simultaneous). Transitions to and from regime types are marked by the first set of elections; the date of a coup; and/or the date on which multiple parties are constitutionally banned/allowed.

The question arises of how to classify years in which a country’s regime type changes. The general convention of extant regime datasets (and on many occasions, Polity IV) is to use the regime that existed at the very end of the year. While this is mechanically convenient, it also leads to some odd classifications. Two examples follow.

- One admittedly extreme but useful case is Nigeria in 1983. Major-General Muhammadu Buhari’s coup that displaced the civilian government took place on December 31, 1983. As a result, Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) code Nigeria 1983 as a military regime, even though all but one day of the year was spent under a civilian regime. Ghana’s transition to autocracy on December 31, 1981 is another “extreme” example.
- Another example is Laos in 1959. Gandhi records this country-year as militaristic due to a military coup that deposes Phoui Sananikone in December. Given that at least eleven months of the year were spent under a democratic regime, 1959 seems better classified as a democracy.

To provide more precise measurement of a country’s regime type in a given year, we use a rounding rule in our coding. Specifically, the year in which a transition occurs is coded as the antecedent regime if the transition occurred on July 1 or later and as the subsequent regime if the transition occurred before July 1. The date of transition is indicated in the column *tdate* in the dataset.

Of course, transitions cannot always be pinpointed to a single day, but in most cases there is a fairly clear event that marks a change in regime type. The following events were used to mark the date of a transition:

- Transitions to military rule are marked by a military coup and/or the declaration of a state of emergency (martial law) that includes the dissolution of the civilian government.

- Transitions to monarchy are marked by the formal passing of political power to a king, emir, or sultan.
- Transitions to multiparty party rule are marked by the legalization of multiparty competition and/or the election of opposition parties into the legislature.
- Transitions to single party rule is marked by the legal dissolution of opposition parties and/or the completion of legislative elections in which one party secures 100% of the seats.
- Transitions to democracy are marked by the completion of a country's first federal level elections or inauguration of the executive.
- Many states enter the dataset after 1950, and their entrance into the dataset is marked by the date independence was achieved.

The rounding rule was also used to determine when countries (re)unify and split apart in the data, such as North/South Vietnam, U.S.S.R./post-Soviet states, and Yugoslavia/Serbia/Montenegro.

While the rounding rule may often capture regimes more accurately overall, we realize that many extant datasets used to study regimes adhere to the "end-of-year" guideline. We therefore include both forms of classification in the dataset.

### **Reporting Errors**

This data is our best effort to sort the world's regimes as accurately and faithfully as possible. However, errors and oversights are practically expected. Should any mistakes be noted in the data, please let us know at [ericmin@stanford.edu](mailto:ericmin@stanford.edu). In doing so, please mention a source or citation that justifies a potential change in the data.

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Below is a list of the main references used to create this dataset. The list is not exhaustive, but captures most of the main sources used.

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Furthermore, we took advantage of Library of Congress's country reports; Encyclopedia Britannica Online (Academic Edition); the U.S. State Department's country profiles; multiple election reports and handbooks; and other country-specific works.

## Appendix: Discrepancies with CGV and GWF

In creating our dataset, we first classified all country-years independently of extant datasets such as Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (CGV; 2010); and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (GWF; 2012). After making these classifications, we compared our results with these extant datasets and attempted to resolve inconsistencies. This process resulted in many corrections, both on the part of our original data and extant datasets. Brief explanations of discrepancies, along with rationales for our classifications on those cases where we overruled CGV, are provided below. Our hope is that this process will help refine the overall pool of regime classifications.

Several general comments are worth making about the following list of discrepancies:

- Discrepancies are only in relation to CGV. Although GWF are mentioned throughout the following justifications, that data was only used as a reference. When such discrepancies were found, we investigated these cases more closely to resolve the inconsistency.
- Our classifications of single party and multiparty were treated as being compatible with CGV's "civilian dictatorship" classification.
- Many of these discrepancies, especially dealing with single years, are concerned with rounding. Therefore, they would not be discrepant in the *regime\_nr* column, but were adjusted for the *regime\_r* column.
- Due to our data collection process, discrepancies were only directly identified up to 2006, even though CGV extends to 2008. Both CGV and GWF were still used as references as was possible from 2007-2012.
- Whenever a dataset provides no coding, that is listed below as "N/A." This is especially common for GWF, and typically occurs when GWF consider the regime to be democratic. However, we sought to avoid jumping to any conclusions about these omissions.

### Afghanistan

- **1953-1962** Monarchy. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = monarchy. Prince Daoud was designated prime minister. It is possible that the prime minister title was just nominal to obtain aid from the U.S., but for all practical purposes, the regime was still a monarchy.
- **1973-1978** Military. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = personal. Daoud himself was not a military officer (which is probably why CGV does not call it a military regime), but he staged his coup in 1973 with the support of military members and retained his control by culling the support of the military and even getting them more arms through the Soviet Union. He was only removed from power through another coup where a different military faction rebelled against him and his military support.
- **1992-2001** Military. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = personal. The more pertinent debate seems to be whether anyone really had substantial control over Afghanistan during this time of constant fighting between competing militias and military groups. Regardless of who was or was not in power, Taliban or Islamic State or otherwise, all power stemmed from military

organizations. It seems reasonable to say effective control of the state (if any) emanated through the military.

### Albania

- **1950-1984** Not military. CGV = military, GWF = party. Hoxha (president until 1985) served as Commander in Chief of armed forces from 1944 to 1985, which probably explains CGV's coding. However, most sources refer to the Hoxha regime through the lens of the Communist Party, which seemed to wield control through the Politburo and Secretariat.
- **1991** Multiparty. CGV = democracy, GWF = party. The Polity score shoots from -9 in 1990 to 1 in 1991 due to political liberalization and allowance of multiple parties and the creation of a provisional presidential government. Violent student protests and boycotting political parties kept the government from functioning through December 1991. Things were too transitory to consider this a democratic year, especially given the effective exclusion of opposition parties via boycott or violence. At best, the country went from being highly autocratic to anocratic.

### Argentina

- **1950-1954** Military. CGV = presidential democracy, GWF = personal. Polity score of -9 lends some degree of confidence that this was not a democratic period. Not only did Peron have a prominent military background, but once Peron took power, he inserted military officers into other positions of power as candidates. The loss of a great deal of military support, along with tensions with the Catholic Church, all led to the military coup that ousted him in 1955.

### Armenia

- **1991-2006** Multiparty. CGV = democracy, GWF = N/A (1991-1993) and personal (1994-1998). Through most of the period, the country's Polity score never breaches 5 and even dives to -6 (after a coup in 1999). Opposition parties were repeatedly suppressed, election results were hotly contested by domestic and international groups. The most plausible time for democracy was 1991-1992, when the score is 7 and Armenia just declared independence. However, the elected president (Levon Ter-Petrosian) in 1991 is the one who began suppressing opposition parties in the first post-independence election in 1995. In sum, this period is classified as autocratic during these years despite the holding of elections because competition was significantly restricted and unfair.

### Bangladesh

- **1975-1976** Military. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = personal. A series of military coups eventually led to Abu Sadat Muhammad Sayem (previously Supreme Court Chief Justice) being installed as president. After a subsequent military mutiny, President Sayem took the additional post of chief martial law administrator and installed various military officers as deputies. Despite President Sayem's non-military background, military interference and management into both executive selection and policy has thus led us to code these years as being under military rule.



- **1979-1980** Military. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = personal. Zia was ostensibly elected into a civilian government. However, after Zia was assassinated in 1991 by dissenting military members, most of the military remained loyal to the current government. In fact, the loyalist majority killed Major General Manzur, who had apparently led the revolting dissenters.
- **1986-1990** Military. CGV = semi-presidential democracy, GWF = personal. Parliament was dissolved in the midst of turmoil in 1987, and opposition parties were totally suppressed in 1988 elections. Mass student protests and military interventions punctuated 1990. Martial law remained in place and campaigns by the government sought even greater political authority for the military.

### Benin

- **1964** Single party. CGV = military, GWF = personal. From January 1964 to December 1965, Sourou-Migan Apithy served as head of a civilian coalition government (which eventually collapsed from infighting and instability). Apithy was not a member of the military, which additionally calls into question why CGV lists this country-year as a military regime.
- **1976-1990** Single party. CGV = military, GWF = personal. Kerekou was an army major before staging his second coup in 1972 to overthrow the government. However, despite the militarized nature of his rise to power, Kerekou transitioned to a single party, Marxist-Leninist system which did not seem to vest the military with effective control of government.

### Bolivia

- **1951** Multiparty. CGV = military, GWF = oligarchy. Although General Hugo Ballivian took power in 1951, he was installed by Mamerto Urriolagoita, the outgoing civilian president who refused to acknowledge his loss to a more populist candidate. Hence, the executive was a member of the military (explaining CGV's classification), but effective control of government was likely not within the military as a whole.
- **1964** Multiparty. CGV = military, GWF = party. The coup which brought General Barrientos Ortunño to power took place in November 1964.
- **1979** Military. CGV = presidential democracy, GWF = military-personal. A tumultuous year, but largely under the control of the military. General Padilla staged a bloodless coup to lead an interim government from 1978 to July 1979, when elections took place. The newly instated civilian government was then pushed out by another military coup led by Colonel Natusch in November 1979. His rule lasted only two weeks, but most of the year was spent under effective military rule.

### Botswana

- **2008** Multiparty. CGV = military, GWF = party. President Seretse Ian Khama was a former military officer, but the regime remained a multiparty/multiparty authoritarian regime (i.e. politics continued in a multiparty institutional setting, dominated by the BDP).

## Burkina Faso

- **1990-2006** Multiparty. CGV = military, GWF = personal. Campaore indeed has a military background, which played a factor in his ability to stage a coup against Sankara in 1987. However, he stepped down from the military role in 1990 in order to participate in civilian elections. The Popular Front-led congress in early 1990, which drafted a new constitution, involved many parties (even though about half of those invited eventually walked out). The resulting June 1991 constitution explicitly allowed for multi-party activity, and many parties were formally recognized by the end of the year. Though the elections were suspect and largely boycotted, Campaore's control of government does not appear to be dependent on the military; the Congress for Democracy and Progress (the ruling political party) is also a conglomeration of civilian parties.

## Burundi

- **2005-2006** Multiparty. CGV = democracy, GWF = N/A. Although making an upward transition toward democracy, 2005-2006 are too tumultuous to consider years of democratic rule. 2005 elections were generally free and fair; civil conflict between government and rebels largely subsided. However, in 2006, the ruling CNDD-FDD government began repressing opposition and was also accused of cooking up a conspiratorial coup attempt to justify heavy-handed measures against the opposition.

## Cambodia

- **1966** Multiparty. CGV = military, GWF = monarchy. Lon Nol had a military background, but executive control did not rely on the military. All power was obtained and maintained through civilian government and elections. Multiple parties existed in this period.
- **1969-1974** Multiparty. CGV = military, GWF = monarchy (1969-1970) and personal (1971-1974). See rationale for 1966, which also applies here.
- **1979-1990** Single party. CGV = military, GWF = party. The Vietnamese military invaded and installed the People's Republic of Kampuchea in 1978/1979. However, the single party communist regime did not depend on military power for effective government control. The military (Vietnamese, not Cambodian) does seem to have played a substantial role in the country's reconstruction efforts.

## Cape Verde

- **1990** Single party. CGV = democracy, GWF = N/A. Major constitutional and electoral reforms led to democracy in and after 1991. Those reforms were only approved in September 1990, so it makes sense to call much of 1990 non-democratic.

## Central African Republic

- **1979** Military. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = personal. CGV agree that the CAR was a military regime prior to 1979. The counter-coup which removed Colonel Bokassa and reinstated David Dacko took place in September of 1979, meaning that most of the year was spent under a military regime.

## Chad

- **1979-1983** Military (1979-1983) and single party (1984-1989). CGV = civilian dictatorship; GWF = military (1979), N/A (1980-1982), personalist (1983). Though not ideal, we consider the years 1979-1981 as militaristic, given the intense and constant fighting between militant groups. Additionally, the four insurgent factions ostensibly shared power in the Transitional Government of National Unity in those years. Habre took power on June 7, 1982. Habre's reign was initially militaristic until he established a single party system in June 1984 until his ouster in December 1990.
- **1997-2006** Multiparty. CGV = military, GWF = personal. Following a period of military rule, Chad transitioned to a civilian rule beginning with the adoption of a new constitution that allowed for competitive (albeit imperfect) multiparty elections in 1996. The 1997 elections saw the Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) party rise to political dominance.

## Chile

- **1973** Democracy. CGV = military, GWF = military-personal. The coup that eventually brought Pinochet to power in 1974 took place in September of 1973. Most of 1973 was spent under Allende's rule.

## Comoros

- **1975-1989** Military. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = N/A. Neither President Abdallah nor Soilih was from the military, but both relied on military power (led by Colonel Denard) in order to stage coups. Furthermore, Abdallah included Denard in the Political-Military Directorate that ruled the country from 1978 to 1989.
- **1990-1994** Multiparty. CGV = semi-presidential democracy, GWF = N/A. There were so many failed coup attempts, dissolutions of parliament, and oustings from government that it's hard to argue that healthy democracy was even close to existing.
- **2002-2003** Multiparty. CGV = military, GWF = N/A. Elections took place in 2001, and having a leader with military background is not sufficient for the years to be classified as military in nature. President Azali was a military member when he staged a coup in 1999, but he stepped down from the presidency in 2002 to run for president under the new transitional constitution. When his term ended in 2006, he stepped down peacefully, further suggesting that the military's role in maintaining power or controlling policy were not a factor during these two years.

## Congo (Brazzaville, Republic)

- **1992-1996** Multiparty. CGV = democracy, GWF = N/A. Polity at best was a 5. Widespread accusations of fraud, confrontation between opposition legislators and military, temporary martial law, and the like all tarnished the country's title as a democracy--even if they had passed legislation calling for multiparty elections in 1992. Also, the country's history is bookended by deeply autocratic rule on both sides of 1992-1996.
- **1997-2006** Multiparty. CGV = military, GWF = personal. Does not have the characteristics of a military regime; the military does not appear to have effective control of government power.

Despite the fact that the military helped Sassou-Nguesso (himself a former member of the military) regain power in October 1997, he has the characteristics of a personalist leader with a multiparty party system keeping him in power.

#### **Congo (Kinshasa; Democratic Republic)**

- **1997-2000** Military. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = personal. Laurent-Desire Kabila came to power through military force and appeared to heavily utilize military force in order to maintain a semblance of order and to enforce his draconian measures. Also important, many of his key cabinet positions were filled by his fellow lieutenants.

#### **Cuba**

- **1952-1958** Military (1952-1954) and multiparty (1955-1958). CGV = military, GWF = personal. Batista was a military leader who led the coup in 1952. The country made a transition to multiparty, civilian rule in November 1954 with the advent of presidential and legislative elections. Batista was declared president, and his party, the National Progressive Coalition, won a majority of the seats. CGV's classification is likely based on the weaker definition of the executive himself being connected to the military.
- **2006** Single party. CGV = military, GWF = party-personal. Raul Castro has a storied military past, but his rule in terms of executive control and institutional design has basically been a continuation of Fidel Castro's personalist single party regime. Both CGV and GWF agree that Fidel Castro's regime was non-military; CGV switches to military in 2006 to account for Raul's military background.

#### **Dominican Republic**

- **1965** Military. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = military. A messy year filled with civil conflict and US/OAS intervention. The intervention took place in April and remained so until elections in 1966, casting some doubt on the idea that the domestic military had effective control of government. 1965 might be better thought of as a transitional year that spent most of its time under foreign intervention. We classify this year as being under military rule and indicate foreign occupation using the *occup* variable, thus capturing both the militaristic and foreign aspects of the regime.
- **1966-1977** Multiparty. CGV = democracy, GWF = personal. Ricard ran for four terms largely unopposed because his regime killed political opponents and people were intimidated out of competing. Additionally, Polity has these years as -3. Considering most agree that Polity has a low ceiling for democracy (see, for example, Treier and Jackman 2008), it is hard to argue this period to be democratic, even institutionally.

#### **Ecuador**

- **1961-1962** Multiparty. CGV = democracy, GWF = N/A. A coup in November 1961 put Monroy in power, who remained until ousted via a military junta in 1963. During this time, politics was still characterized by the participation and competition of multiple civilian parties, which include the parliamentary elections (lower house) in 1962.

- **2000-2001** Military. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = N/A. Military ousts Mahuad in January 2000. Military support led to the presidency of Gustavo Noboa Bejarro. Military support was essential to retaining executive power. A state of emergency was also instituted to stem the opposition.

### El Salvador

- **1980-1981** Military. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = party-military. The five-member junta was comprised of two military officers (Colonels Gutierrez and Majano) and three civilians. While the civilian members resigned in 1980, leaving the junta in slight tumult, the junta was decidedly militaristic in nature through 1981.

### Ethiopia

- **1974** Monarchy. CGV = military, GWF = monarchy. Dissent within the ranks existed since the beginning of 1974, but the military only claimed effective power by deposing the emperor on September 12, 1974.

### Fiji

- **1970-1986** Democracy. CGV = autocracy, GWF = N/A. CGV probably has this coded as an autocracy because it was technically under the British monarchy during this time. However, all signs point to the idea that Fiji was fully sovereign and independent during this time--the British monarchy was only titular in rule. Parliamentary elections were free and fair until the coups that started in 1987.
- **1992-2005** Multiparty. CGV = democracy, GWF = N/A. The legislative composition from 1992-1998 deliberately favored ethnic Fijians. In 1999, these biases were ameliorated but not eliminated. The 2000 coup by George Speight punctuated only two months. Commodore Bainimarama staged the counter-coup against Speight and installed Ilioi and supported the office of Qarase. Though political turmoil began in May, the military-backed government was not established until July. The High Court reversed these actions in November 2000, meaning that the post-coup regime backed by Bainimarama lasted only four months. The interim government set up by the military was disbanded in 2001. The following government is a continuation of the 1999 regime. Electoral rules ensured that the ethnic majority retained a majority of the seats in the legislature.

### Gambia

- **1997-2006** Multiparty. CGV = military, GWF = personal. Although Jammeh was a young military officer that came to power through a coup in 1994, Jammeh transitioned all power to a civilian government, finishing this process in April 1997 when all cabinet members were civilians. There is also little to suggest that Jammeh has wielded military power or is subject to military power since he was elected to the presidency in 1997.

## Ghana

- **1969** Military. CGV = parliamentary democracy, GWF = military. The National Liberation Council (NLC) was led by Lt. Gen. Ankrah, who promised a transition to civilian rule. National Assembly elections in August 1969 only made limited gains and the three-member Presidential Commission was also composed of members of the NLC.
- **1981** Democracy. CGV = military, GWF = N/A. The coup that led to the Rawlings government took place on December 31.
- **1996-2000** Multiparty. CGV = democracy, GWF = personal. Rawlings and his National Democratic Congress party secured by the executive and supermajority in the legislature through the 1996 elections. Low executive constraints indicate the autocratic nature of the regime, which is further corroborated by the low Polity score of 2. By Przeworski's definition, these years might be "democratic" since Rawlings did peacefully transfer power in 2000.

## Greece

- **1950-1966** Monarchy. CGV = parliamentary democracy, GWF = N/A. This period does not seem to be a meaningful democracy, considering that once there was conflict within the government, a military faction staged a coup and took over in 1967. The two kings that ruled during this time assembled governments and seemed to have meaningful executive power that actually affected politics in the country.
- **1974** Military. CGV = parliamentary democracy, GWF = military. Polity score is -7. The transitional caretaker government was only established in July 1973; military rule by Ioannides was still prominent during this time.
- **1979-1983** Military. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = N/A. Maurice Bishop himself was not a military officer, but the paramilitary operation that staged the coup against incumbent Gairy led to a regime that was backed by the People's Revolutionary Army, which largely served to support Bishop's interests until internal fractures led to Bishop's loss of power to Prime Minister Coard in 1983 (and even Coard appealed to the military in order to push Bishop out of office).

## Guatemala

- **1958-1962** Military. CGV = presidential democracy, GWF = personal. Many coups occurred during this time period, challenging the idea that a stable democracy existed. General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes was ostensibly elected into office after Castillo was assassinated, but his autocratic style of rule (Polity is -5 or -6) and military background call CGV's classification into question. His rule was practically a military dictatorship.
- **1970-1981** Military. CGV = presidential democracy, GWF = military. Similar to 1958-1962, the "presidential" regimes during this time were hardly democratic and utilized the military to suppress dissent. The United States' constant flow of military support to Guatemala also indicates the regimes' dependence on military forces to maintain power.

## Guinea

- **1994-2006** Multiparty. CGV = military, GWF = N/A. Conte was a colonel before claiming power, but likely completed his transition to civilian rule by about 1993, regardless of whether the subsequent elections and hold on power can be deemed free or fair. While CGV says the executive was from the military, their coding also acknowledges multi-party competition through a legislative institution. These years are coded as multiparty because politics and policy were conducted and determined through legislative institutions at this time and because we do not consider an executive head with military affiliations to be a sufficient indicator of military rule.

## Guinea-Bissau

- **1980** Single party. CGV = military, GWF = party. Transition from single party rule to military rule took place in November 1980.
- **1995-1999** Multiparty. CGV = military, GWF = personal. Vieira was an army major, but the military was not necessary for him to maintain power. In fact, his interaction with the military (firing the chef of staff and pushing back small splinter forces) suggest that the military often was not even on his side while he exercised authority. Vieira also stepped down from his military post in 1991 and stood for presidential elections. Finally, multiple parties held seats in the legislature during this time.

## Guyana

- **1993-2006** Democracy. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = N/A. There were a fair share of scuffles within the legislature, but the executive remained relatively constrained by the courts, and elections were generally deemed to be competitive, fair, and impartial. Though we do not include civil liberties in our coding of democracy, the existence of civil liberty guarantees such as freedom of the press provide an additional indicator of meaningful democracy. Polity is 6 throughout 1993-2006.

## Haiti

- **1956-1962** Military. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = personal. Duvalier's regime was based on the power of a newly-purged military and the installation of loyal officers into the inner government, even if Duvalier himself was not a military member.
- **1990** Military. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = military-personal. The transition to (brief) civilian rule did not occur until December.
- **1992-1993** Military. CGV = civilian dictatorship; GWF = military. A coup installed military rule in September 1991. Aristide was restored to the presidency in late 1994.

## Honduras

- **1957-1962** Multiparty. CGV = presidential democracy, GWF = N/A. Villeda Morales, who dominated politics during this time, sought to help transition the country to democracy, but the country was unable to consolidate such democratic institutions. His office was ended by another military coup. The low Polity score of -1 corroborates our coding of these years as autocratic.

- **1971** Military. CGV = presidential democracy, GWF = party-military. A bit complicated since Ramon Ernesto Cruz Ucles was technically elected as a non-military leader in June 1971 (ended in December 1972), but was sandwiched by military regimes on either side. Arguably, Cruz was not in power long enough to say that the regime was free of military influence.

#### Iraq

- **2003-2006** Single party (2003-2004) and multiparty (2005-2006). CGV = military, GWF = personal. While imperfect, we consider the Iraqi Governing Council, whose members were hand-selected by the US's Coalition Provisional Authority, to be a single entity. The transitory nature of these years is indicated in the coding of the *trans* variable. After the elections in early 2005, the regime can be considered multiparty as multiple parties vied for power in the nascent government.

#### Kenya

- **1998-2001** Multiparty. CGV = democracy, GWF = party. -2 on Polity during these years. Real democratic reform would not come until 2002 with the Kibaki presidency, during which time the new administration uncovered just how corrupt the Moi administration had been between before 2002. The 1997 vote leading to Moi's reelection were also riddled with irregularities and the removal of the office of vice president.

#### Korea, North (Democratic People's Republic)

- **1950-1993** Single party. CGV = military, GWF = party-personal. Despite strong militaristic iconography and prominence of militarized organizations such as the National Defense Commission, North Korea is still better described as a strong single party state, largely dictated by the Workers' Party of Korea. Elections featuring unopposed, party-vetted candidates also attest to the importance of the single party nature of the regime. The high place of military is considered a policy of the civilian regime.

#### Kyrgyzstan

- **2005-2006** Multiparty. CGV = democracy, GWF = personal. 2005 was a highly tumultuous year in which elections had major irregularities favoring the incumbent party and mass demonstrations resulted in near anarchy in several regions of the country. 2006 was a transitional year (Polity goes from -2 to 3), but too many features of change are still tenuous or failed to sustain themselves.

#### Laos

- **1959** Democracy. CGV = military, GWF = personal. The democratic regime remained in place until April 1960.
- **1992-2006** Single party. CGV = military, GWF = party. A handful of military officers may have held positions of power within the top levels of government, but most of the effective power rested within the Lao People's Revolutionary Party—Laos's outpost for the Communist Party.



## Lebanon

- **1988** Multiparty. CGV = military, GWF = N/A. The ejection of the civilian government and replacement by a provisional military government took place in September 1988.
- **1998-2006** Multiparty. GV = military, GWF = N/A. General Emile Lahoud, the army chief of staff, was elected president in late 1998. He did not have to relinquish his military title in order to stand as president. Lahoud wielded extensive control, often backed by Syria. It was not the Lebanese military per se that exercised power domestically, and party politics seem highly active in the state.

## Madagascar

- **1977-1992** Single party (1977-1991) and multiparty (1992). CGV = military, GWF = personal. The offices of president and prime minister were largely held by members of the military, but effective control of government did not emanate from the military itself. Madagascar was a centralized socialist state with a party apparatus, not exercising powers like a military dictatorship. The new constitution was approved by referendum in 1992, and the first round of presidential elections took place in November 1992. Despite the passage of a new constitution in 1992 that called for open politics, elected president Zafy stood at odds with prime minister Ravony and was accused of taking unconstitutional actions until he was basically voted out of office by the assembly with the support of the courts. The president was not completely elected, nor democracy really established, until 1993.

## Mali

- **1991** Single party. CGV = military, GWF = personal. There is no ideal classification for this country-year. Traore was ousted in March, then Lieutenant Colonel Toure helped form the Transitional Committee for the Salvation of the People (CTSP) a few days later. A military offshoot failed in a coup attempt in July. The CTSP, in control from March 1991 to January 1992, was composed of 10 military and 15 civilian members. The transitional government was unitary still not military in nature.

## Mexico

- **1952-1957** Multiparty. CGV = military, GWF = party. Despite having military members as leaders of the executive, Mexico was not a military regime. The PRI has dominated politics through a multiparty regime since the late 1920's. See Magaloni (2006) for an in-depth study of the PRI's rule.
- **1997-1999** Democracy. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = personal. Democratic elections took place in 1997, triggering a democratic transition that eventually led to the long-standing incumbent Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) losing power in 2000. Furthermore, we defer to Magaloni (2006).

## Mongolia

- **1990-1991** Multiparty. CGV = democracy, GWF = party. Mongolia was on its way to democracy. However, only the Little Hural (the lower house of the legislature) began to select its members via competitive elections. Democracy was not fully consolidated until 1992.

## Nepal

- **2006** Democracy. CGV = monarchy, GWF = monarchy. In 2006, Nepal began a transition to non-monarchical rule when the legislature took away most de facto rights and responsibilities from the king. This was completed in 2008 via an amendment that formalized this arrangement, but the de facto transition had already occurred in 2006.

## Nicaragua

- **1950-1955** Multiparty. CGV = military, GWF = personal. CGV's criteria of a military member being executive is too weak here. CGV call 1951-1955 (Anatasio Somoza Garcia) and 1967-1978 (Anatasio Somoza Debayle) military regimes since the executives were military officials, but then call the time in between a civilian dictatorship even though the Somozas controlled the military. Even CGV seem to agree that the Somoza control of the military does not equate with effective control of government.
- **1967-1978** Multiparty. Magaloni = multiparty, CGV = military, GWF = personal. See rationale for Nicaragua 1950-1955.
- **1979-1989** Single party (1979-1984) and multiparty (1985-1989). CGV = civilian dictatorship (1979-1983) and presidential democracy (1984-1989), GWF = party. The Sandinistas had a great deal of control by mid-1980 and then ruled independently until 1983. In 1984, the Sandinistas were pressured into having open presidential and legislative elections in November 1984. However, many opposition regimes withdrew from the campaign and the Sandinistas retained most power. Polity has 1984 as a -1 on Polity, which challenges the classification of (presidential) democracy.

## Nigeria

- **1983** Democracy. CGV = military, GWF = military. The military takeover led by Major General Buhari took place in December of 1983. Most of the year was spent under (increasingly unpopular) civilian and democratic rule.
- **1999-2006** Multiparty. CGV = democracy, GWF = N/A. Despite competitive elections, the People's Democratic Party has dominated the executive and legislature. Additionally, elections (despite being generally accepted by the international community) have been criticized as being unfair and preceded by violence.

## Pakistan

- **1962-1968** Multiparty. CGV = military, GWF = military-personal. Ayub Khan (president during precisely these years) was Field Marshall and commander of the armed forces, but his form of rule was ostensibly more multiparty than militaristic, relying on the votes of 80,000 Basic

Democrats that were essentially under his control. He even decreased military funding during his time in office.

- **1971** Military. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = military-personalist. Although elections took place in early 1971, the Assembly did not open on time in March, and elections to fill 79 vacated seats (due to the government disqualifying the Awami League) did not take place that year.
- **1988** Military. CGV = parliamentary democracy, GWF = military-personal. Elections only took place in November 1988. Moreover, General Zia was killed in August 1988. Even though a transition appeared to begin in June, Zia's death is noted as the true end of de facto military control.

### Panama

- **1951** Multiparty. CGV = military, GWF = personal. Alcibiades Arosemena, the leader associated with the military regime in CGV's data, was only a transitional ruler. The National Police (Panama's alternative to a standing army) pushed Arias out of power in 1951. The National Police is technically not a military, though they were led by military officials (Remon) and had many military-trained personnel. The National Police eventually turned into the National Guard by 1953.
- **1968** Democracy. CGV = military, GWF = military-personal. The coup that ousted the democratic regime did not occur until October 1968.
- **1989** Military. CGV = democracy, GWF = military-personal. Mass electoral fraud throughout. A United States invasion to instate the true winner took place only on December 20, 1989, meaning only up to 11 days were spent under democratic rule.

### Paraguay

- **1989-1995** Military (1989-1992) and multiparty (1993-1995). CGV = semi-presidential democracy, GWF = party-military-personal. 1989-1992 were the years of General Rodriguez after he overthrew Stroessner in a coup. While this transitional period was presidential and allowed for multiple parties to participate in elections, Rodriguez and the military likely held real control of government until the new basic law was drafted and new president was elected. Rodriguez didn't retire from the military until after his presidency, either. The Colorado Party dominated both the presidency and congress from 1993-1995 with the military's assistance. 1995 was a meaningful turning point in which General Oviedo peacefully stepped down from the army for violating constitutional bans against military involvement in politics, and multiparty competition was able to take place without military interference.

### Peru

- **1968** Democracy. CGV = military, GWF = military. The regime was a democracy during the first ten months of the year. Dictatorship only came in October 1968 via coup.
- **1990-1991** Democracy. CGV = autocracy, GWF = N/A. The coup that led to autocratic rule occurred in 1992. Congress granted Fujimori emergency powers in 1991, but still within the framework of the extant government. No extra-constitutional power-grabbing had yet occurred.

## Philippines

- **1986** Multiparty. CGV = presidential democracy, GWF = personal. Democratic elections did not occur until February 1987. 1986 was tumultuous but generally filled with in-fighting among the contemporary competitors within the regime (which was classified as multiparty in preceding years).

## Poland

- **1981-1988** Single party. CGV = military, GWF = party (1981-1986) and N/A (1987-1988). While General Jaruzelski did impose martial law through mid-1993, Poland was largely at the behest of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), which was largely deferential to Moscow.

## Sierra Leone

- **1968-1970** Military. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = military (1968) and party (1969-1970). A military coup installed Stevens as a "civilian government" but the power of the civilian government depended on the military. In fact, there were additional coup attempts, which only stayed attempts and not successes due to the military support behind the civilian government.
- **1985-1991** Single party. CGV = military, GWF = party. The previous regime was single party. President Stevens handed power to General Momoh, who was not officially sworn in until early 1986. Even under Momoh's rule, the pre-existing single party structure sustained his authority.
- **1998-2001** Multiparty. CGV = presidential democracy, GWF = N/A. The Kabbah regime made efforts to democratize, but regional intervention by ECOWAS and in-fighting during transition prevented true democracy. It was not until elections in 2002 that the process was deemed fair and competitive.

## Singapore

- **2004-2006** Multiparty. CGV = military, GWF = party. There is little evidence to suggest that Singapore had any transition to military rule in 2004.

## Somalia

- **1969** Democracy. CGV = autocracy, GWF = N/A. The democratic state was dissolved by the military in late October 1969.
- **1991-2006** Omitted. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = N/A. Such an extreme case of anarchy that we opted to simply omit these years (and through 2011) from the dataset.

## South Africa

- **1994-2006** Democracy. CGV = autocracy, GWF = oligarchy (1994) and N/A (1995-2006). This period is characterized by free and fair competitive elections. Additionally, these years have consistently received a 9 on the Polity scale.

## Spain

- **1950-1974** Single party. CGV = military, GWF = personal. CGV's classification is likely from Franco being a member of the military. While his rule was dictatorial, it was not necessarily conducted via or with difference to the military. Almost all of CGV's institutional covariates also point to a single party. For some reason, the measure of "parties in the legislature" is 0 ("either no legislature of all members of the legislature are nonpartisan")—perhaps because the Cortes had practically no effective power. Even so, the National Movement was the only sanctioned party during this time.

## Sri Lanka

- **1977-1982** Democracy. CGV = autocracy, GWF = N/A (1977) and party (1978-1982). An opposition party (the United National Party) won power in 1977 elections, and power was largely transferred in a peaceful manner. Constitutional meddling to prolong presidential and legislative term limits did not begin until 1983. During this period, the Polity score ranges from 8 to 5, descending in some years. This indicates a gradual failure of democracy; we indicate the transition from democracy to autocracy as occurring in 1983 when institutional features were explicitly altered to empower the ruling party.

## Sudan

- **1964** Military. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = military. The protest that dislodged the military regime did not take place until November.  
**1971-1984** Single party. CGV = military, GWF = personal. In September, Nimeiry dissolved the Revolutionary Command Council, which was packed with military officers and had ruled the country following his 1969 coup. At the same time, he promulgated a single party regime in which the Sudanese Socialist Union was the only recognized party.

## Syria

- **1958-1962** Drop from data (1958-1961) and military (1962). CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = personal (1958) and N/A (1959-1962). Syria merged with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic from 1958 through late 1961 (thereafter seceding). The dataset uses Egypt 1958-1961 to record these unified years; Syria is omitted to avoid double-counting. Abd al-Karim al-Nahlawi led the coup which resulted in Syria's split from Egypt in 1961 and took power for himself in 1962.

## Taiwan

- **1950-1974** Single party. CGV = military, GWF = party. The regime was single party (Kuomintang; KMT). The KMT has military origins but operates in a civilian setting.
- **1992-1995** Multiparty. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = party. The country was already transitioning to democracy, but this was not truly consolidated until the elections in 1996. The KMT remained the predominant party.

## Tanzania

- **2005-2006** Multiparty. CGV = military, GWF = party. The regime clearly involves multiple military parties; there is little evidence of military influence. Kikwete became president in 2005 and had a military background (triggering CGV's classification), but the regime itself was not militaristic.

## Thailand

- **1973** Military. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = military-personal. The upheaval of protests that led to civilian rule did not occur until October.
- **1979-1990** Military. CGV = parliamentary democracy, GWF = military-personal. General Prem Tinsulanonda was commander in chief of the army and minister of defense. Although civilians were part of his government, the regime was predominantly under (somewhat precarious) military control. Polity has these years as 2 or 3.

## Togo

- **1994-2004** Multiparty. CGV = military; GWF = personal. Prior to 1994, the military often acted on its own in order to defend the status quo, without Eyadema's approval. Despite a transitional period from 1991-1993, the military predominantly held control of power until February 1994. Multiparty elections that occurred then, and subsequent elections, however fraught with fraud, led to the entry of opposition parties and true transition to a multiparty system.

## Tunisia

- **1987-2006** Multiparty. CGV = military, GWF = party. The Ben Ali government legalized some political parties. Ben Ali may have been a general, but his rule did not have its core in the military. Ben Ali's rise to power was in accordance with the constitution.

## Turkey

- **1950-1953** Democracy. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = party (1950) and N/A (1951-1953). The Democratic Party was brought to power by free and fair elections in 1950 and was in power until they were ousted in a coup in 1960.
- **1971-1972** Military. CGV = parliamentary democracy, GWF = N/A. -2 on Polity. The military forced the Demirel regime to leave office and then oversaw the subsequent "nonparty" governments that existed until elections in 1973. While the military did not explicitly take power, it supported martial law and oversaw the establishment of special courts to quell dissent.

## Uganda

- **1962-1965** Democracy. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = N/A. CGV likely coded this as civilian dictatorship because the ruling Uganda People's Congress (UPC) deposed the leadership in 1966. However, the UPC was elected democratically. No retroactive coding to be applied here. Consistent with our coding, Polity has these years as 7.
- **1980-1984** Multiparty. CGV = democracy, GWF = personal. Polity score = 3. The December 1980 elections were not fairly conducted, and there were only weak constraints on the executive.

Competing parties—the Democratic Party and Uganda Patriotic Movement—were allowed to compete, but the prevailing regime (Uganda People’s Congress) held a stark supermajority of the elected offices.

- **1986-2005** Single party. CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = personal. Museveni has strong control over the military and is a Lieutenant General, but this is not analogous to having a military regime. Museveni took over the National Resistance Movement, which was established in 1980, and apparently sought to make the organization the centerpiece of a civilian regime. In mid-2005 (and realized in elections in 2006), Museveni opened the way to a multi-party system. Technically, 1985-2005 were a no-party regime, but we opt against creating such a rarely used classification and instead note the predominance of the NRM during this time.

### Venezuela

- **2002-2006** Multiparty. CGV = democracy, GWF = democracy (2002-2005) and personal (2006). Mainwaring codes 2000-2001 as democratic, but only semi-democratic beginning in 2002. In 2002, a military coup led to the imprisonment of then president Chavez and the instatement of Pedro Carmona as the new president. The coup eventually failed due to strong support for Chavez, but Chavez began to consolidate power by stacking the courts in 2004 and passing legislation to enhance political supremacy. Thus, military intervention followed by autocratization of the existing regime indicates a break in 2002 from the previously democratic rule.

### Vietnam

- **1997-2000** Single party. CGV = military, GWF = party. CGV’s classification is likely from Le Kha Phieu having a military background. However, he was very much a technocrat without deep military roots, promoted too quickly to consolidate power at any stage.

### Vietnam, South (Republic)

- **1955-1975** Single party (1955-1963), military (1964-1974), single party (1975). CGV = N/A, GWF = party (but makes no distinction between North and South). These years simply seem overlooked by extant datasets. Bao Dai led the fledgling State of Vietnam until October 1955, when he was ousted by Diem via national referendum. Diem’s regime was civilian in nature, but most political opposition to his party (Can Lao) was outlawed or suppressed outright. The military coup on November 1, 1963 forced Diem out of power, leading the way to Thieu’s government and successive counter-coups within the military. Although Thieu was then “democratically” elected in 1969, his power and policymaking continued to emanate from the military. The ouster of the government in April 1975 (after the fall of Saigon to North Vietnam) made way for the Provisional Revolutionary Government, which began the process of reunification with the Communist North Vietnam.

### Yemen

- **1962-1973** Monarchy (1962) and military (1963-1973). CGV = civilian dictatorship, GWF = military (1962-1967) and personal (1968-1974). The jolt out of monarchy did not take place until

September 1962. Until 1970, the regime is clearly military and ruled by al-Salal and his army officers. The initially established Consultative Council later turned into the Military Command Council and the regime was unstable due to coups and assassinations for years thereafter.